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I. INTRODUCTION & THESis
A.

Introduction

The definition of "security" is a threshold issue for the development of
both state and federal securities regulation.' This is because, in either a federal
or state court, the conclusion that a case does not involve a "security" will
foreclose application of the relevant securities act. For example, the question
of whether or not a state legislature has determined to reverse the common-

law rule of caveat emptor for the sale of pyramid investment schemes or oil
drilling leases or apple orchard syndications depends on whether these trans-

actions involve a "security." If a "security" is involved, the transaction is
subject to the affirmative antifraud protection afforded by the state securities
statute. If not, the laissez-faire, common-law rule will apply. One invokes
the same analysis to determine if the federal antifraud rule will apply.
It is unremarkable to find that parallel statutes, such as federal and state

securities legislation, should both depend on the definition of their common
subject matter for their application. The centrality of the definition of
"security" is self-evident in either a federal or state version of a securities
statute. 2 The point, however, leads one to a second and more interesting

1. See Williamson B.C. Chang, Meaning, Reference, and Reification in the Definition of
a Security, 19 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 403, 421 n.92 (1986) (stating that "[t]he very nature of the
concept of a security is that it triggers the application of the securities acts").
2. The definition of "security" is found in Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. 15
U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1988). A very similar definition is also found in Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Id. § 78c(a)(10). The United States Supreme Court has consistently held
that the two definitions will be treated as if identical. E.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S.
56, 61 n.1 (1990); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985); Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
Section 401(1) of the UNisoam SEcuRrrms ACT (1956), 7B U.L.A. 580 (1985) (last amended
in 1958), is identical, with minor exceptions, to the Securities Act's definition. See Comment to
UNrFoEm SEcuRrrms ACT (1956) § 4010) cmt., 7B U.L.A. 583 (1985). The 1956 version of the
Uniform Securities Act has been adopted in 35 states, although with some variation to the
definition of "security." The definition in the 1985 version is found in Section 101(16). UNiFoRm
SacurRsus ACT (1985) § 101(16), 7B U.L.A. 75 (1993 Supp.) (last amended in 1988). It is also
virtually identical to the federal definition. See UeiWoRm SEcuarms ACT (1985) § 101 cmt. 17,
7B U.L.A. 78 (1993 Supp.).
For a general discussion of the statutory definitions of "security," see Lewis D. Lowenfels
& Alan R. Bromberg, What is a Security Under the FederalSecurities Laws?, 56 ALB. L. Ray.
473, 474-89 (1993).
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question. Given that both federal and state courts must struggle with the
definition of "security" to determine the ambit of the laws, must they reach
the same answer?
Most state courts have assumed that the term "security" should have the
same meaning under both federal and state law. 3 While couched within
different regulatory legislation uttered by different sovereigns, these courts
nevertheless concluded that like terms must have like definitions. As a result,
these state courts exhibited a strong deference to federal 4answers, even
accepting federal precedent with which they openly disagreed.
This deference to federal law is interesting since securities regulation
began as state law. For over two decades before the adoption of the federal
regime, the sale and trading of securities were exclusively the subject of state
regulation.5 The area only became a federal issue when Congress enacted the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In fact it
was the state securities statutes, or so-called "blue sky" laws, that provided
models for the federal legislation. 6 However, despite their status as the
forebearers of the federal statutes, state securities laws have long since taken
a back seat to the federal regulation. Although Congress specifically refused
to preempt state blue sky laws,7 the federal legislation has dominated the
area. Indeed, in a reversal of roles, the state legislatures now often look to
8
the federal statute as the model for their own legislation.
One principle of the Uniform Securities Act, the predominant model for
modem state statutes, is the harmonization of state and federal regulation. 9
The Uniform Securities Act often achieves this end by coordinating with the
comparable federal requirements. The most obvious example of harmonizing

3. See cases discussed infra Part III.

4. See cases discussed infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws,
E. PARRISH, SEcUrITIES REGuLATnON AND THE
Naw DEAL 5-41 (1970) (discussing historical development of national securities regulation).
6. The federal statutes, including the definition of "security" upon which most current

70 Thx. L. REv. 347 (1991). See also MicKAm.

state statutes are based, was in turn based on prior state legislation. See Louis Loss & Jon
SmoMAN, SacttrrEs REGULATION 869 n.l (1989) (stating that "[s]ection 2(1) [of the Securities
Act] was modeled on the definitions in some of the state blue sky laws"); Lowenfels & Bromberg,
supra note 2, at 488 (noting that "[t]he definition of the term 'security' contained in the 1933

Act was modeled upon earlier definitions in state blue sky laws").
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1988).
8. We have already seen that the federal definition of "security" has been incorporated
into state statutes through the Uniform Securities Act. See discussion supra note 2. Another
important example of state law following the federal precedent is the antifraud provision. Section
101 of the UNiroos SEcuRrrms ACT, 7B U.L.A. 516 (1985) (last amended in 1958), was expressly
modeled after the federal Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-5 (1992), and Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988). See UNIFoPs SEcurmis AcT (1956) § 101
cmt., 78 U.L.A. 516 (1985).
9. UtiuoPm SEcupTIES AcT (1956) § 415, 7B U.L.A. 678 (1985) (last amended in 1958),
provides: "This act shall be so construed as to... coordinate the interpretation and administration

of this act with the related federal regulation." See also UNIoRM Sactrms AcT (1985) § 803,
7B U.L.A. 132 (1993 Supp.) (last amended in 1988) (same provision).
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by coordination is the Uniform Securities Act's provision for registration of
new offerings by coordination. 0 To avoid the inefficiencies of duplicative
regulation, issuers whose offerings are registered under the federal securities
laws need only file copies of their federal filings with the state authorities
and may even obtain automatic state approval as a consequence of federal
approval. In these cases, the benefits of harmony are evident. One need only
imagine the consequences to corporate finance if each offering required
separate and full-blown registration and approval from both federal and
numerous state authorities.
The Uniform Securities Act is also seen as pursuing harmony when it
mimicks the federal standards. In these cases, rather than subsume their
separate regulatory regimes within the federal scheme, state regulations simply
duplicate the federal standards. For example, a state will pattern its antifraud
provision on the words of the federal Rule lOb-5." It is often assumed that
the benefits of uniformity again underlie the parallels between the state and
the federal statutes.
Several state courts have viewed the policy of harmonization as a mandate
to follow federal court precedent in interpreting similarly phrased provisions
in their respective securities acts, including the term "security.' 2 This Article
concludes, however, that there are compelling reasons for state courts to
reject recent United States Supreme Court precedents in their efforts to define
the term "security" and thereby delimit the scope of their own state's securities
act.
B. Thesis
Focusing specifically on the Court's textualist or literalist approach to
the definition of "security" in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth3 and Reves
v. Ernst & Young 4 and more generally on its growing refusal to inquire into
the economic realities of a given investment scheme to determine the appropriateness of applying the federal securities laws, this Article identifies various
institutional issues unique to federal courts as the motivation for the Court's
recent utterances. Whatever the merits of the Court's concern, the important
point for this Article is that such concerns are irrelevant for state courts. By
accepting recent Supreme Court precedent as controlling in defining "security," state courts are importing, without reason, the Supreme Court's
handwringing over its appropriate role within the federalconstitutional scheme
of government. As traditional common-law courts, the state! courts need not
anguish in the same way over their attempts to interpret a state statute in a
manner which makes sense in light of its purpose. Furthermore, while the

10. UNioRM SEcuRrTIs ACT (1956) § 303, 7B U.L.A. 559 (1985) (last amended in 1958);
UrmUoiM SEcURIrS ACT (1985), 7B U.L.A. 93 (1993 Supp.) (last amended in 1988).
11.
12.
13.
14.

See discussion supra note 8.
See cases discussed infra notes 98 & 136 and accompanying text.
471 U.S. 681 (1985).
494 U.S. 56 (1990).
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authors accept as a general matter the need for harmonizing the federal and
state regulations, this Article rejects that policy when the specific issue is the
definition of "security." While the benefits of coordinating filing requirements
for securities transactions subject to the dual levels of regulation are obvious,
there is no need for uniformity in the scope of federal and state securities
statutes. This conclusion stems, admittedly, from the authors' opinion that
the state courts have simply done a better job in developing doctrine in this
area.

This Article begins with a review of the Supreme Court decisions on the
definition of "security." For decades the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts appeared comfortable with a case-by-case analysis of each new
investment transaction to determine the appropriateness 'of invoking the
provisions of the federal securities laws." In the mid-1980s this focus on
"economic realities" gave way to a pedantic obsession with plain meaning.' 6
Under this new literalist approach, whether or not there is any justification
for imposing the federal regulatory regime on a transfer of control of a
business, if instruments denominated as "stock" are involved, the Court has
held itself to be powerless to look beyond the labels and consider the policy
of the legislation in determining whether stock is a "security." The Court
has adopted a similar presumption that instruments bearing the label "note"
are securities.17 A literal approach to "stock" and "notes" comes at the
expense of a deliberative, policy-oriented development of the federal securities
laws. Even worse, federal courts have used the label "general partnership"
to evade even a factual inquiry into the need for securities law protection in
cases involving precisely the type of fraudulent investment scheme one would
expect the securities laws to address. 8 Viewed simply from the narrow interests
of the wise development of securities law doctrine, little justification exists
for the Court's literalist approach in these cases.' 9
This Article argues that the Court should not have rejected an overarching
economic realities approach to the scope of the federal securities laws. By
viewing the developing standards under the famous Howey test as a movement
toward a global standard for identifying "securities" rather than simply the
subpart "investment contracts," the Court could have allowed for a more
coherent doctrinal development.1°
15. See discussion infra Part II. A.
16. See discussion infra Part II. B.
17. See discussion infra Part II. C.
18. See infra Part V.
19. Of course, this is not an uncontested assessment. For opposing views, see, e.g., Thomas
Lee Hazen, Taking Stock of Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corporations: When is Stock
Not a Security?, 61 N.C. L. REv. 393, 404-06 (1983) (arguing for literal approach to definition
and rejection of "sale of business" doctrine); Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, The
Sale of Business Doctrine: New Relieffrom Securities Regulation or a New Haven for Welshers?,
44 Omio ST. L.J. 473, 484 (1983) (same); Gordon Shneider, The Sale of a Business DoctrineAnother View, 37 Sw. L.J. 461 (1983) (same); Brent Orrin Hatch, Note, Repudiating the Saleof-Business Doctrine, 83 CoLuM. L. REv. 1718, 1720-26 (1983) (same); Jacque Lynn Nims,
Comment, A Criticism of the Sale of Business Doctrine, 71 CAL. L. Rev. 974, 985 (1983) (same).
20. See infra notes 252-59 and accompanying text.
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Although the authors advocate such a critique, the principal assertion of
this Article. is that a rejection of the Supreme Court's doctrinal solution is
not necessary to the conclusion that state court's should not consider themselves compelled to follow federal precedent. The key to this conclusion is
an understanding of the broader context of the Court's new literalist approach.
The conclusion that "stock" or "notes" must be literally construed to be
"securities" because the text of the statutory definition says so is not a
decision made from the narrow perspective of securities law but from the
Court's larger concern over statutory interpretation generally, a concern which
2
does not constrain state courts .
Nevertheless, several state court decisions have followed the Supreme
Court precedents despite often overt disagreement with their reasoning. To
examine the impact of the Supreme Court's decisions in Landreth and Reves
on state courts' interpretation of the term "security," the authors have
examined all state court decisions on the definition since 1985. The authors
have discovered that whereas state courts have felt compelled to follow the
Supreme Court's new literalist approach in the limited cases involving "stock,""
elsewhere a purpose-based, economic realities approach continues to flourish
under state law.? In fact, in cases involving "notes," the courts have ignored
the literalist aspects of the Reves decision in favor of the four prong, Howeylike test developed by the Supreme Court in the second part of the Reves
opinion.I
The authors' conclusion is that this flexible, purpose-based approach
should be allowed to encompass even the cases of "stock." Neither deference
by the state courts to federal precedent nor a slavish policy of uniformity is
warranted. In fact, to misappropriate a metaphor from those who advocate
federal deregulation, it is perhaps time again for the federal regime to learn
from the laboratories of the states. While the Supreme Court's literalist
approach has infiltrated into the state courts, it has not had the same cabinning
effect on the economic realities approach as it has had in the federal courts.
Therefore, state courts have since 1985 come farther in developing a holistic
approach to the definition of "security" and the scope of the securities laws.

II. THm RISE OF LITERAISM AND THE DEMIsE OF EcoNoMIc REAIE5S

IN

THE SUPREME COtURT's DEFINION OF "SEcumRY"
A.

The Economic Realities Approach-An Overview of the Pre-Landreth
Decisions

In the "old days," federal courts read the definition of a security broadly,
mindful of the remedial purpose of securities regulation.? The Supreme Court

21. See discussion infra Part IV. A.
22. See cases discussed infra Part III. A.
23. See cases discussed infra Part III. C.
24. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
25. For more detailed survey of the Supreme Court's earlier opinions on the definition of
security, see Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 2, at 489-518.
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led the courts in this effort. In particular, the Court used "investment
contract" to trap novel or uncommon schemes within the securities laws'
grasp in whatever form they appeared.
For example, the Court noted in SEC v. Joiner Co.26 that items other
than stocks and bonds found to be securities
are of a more variable character and were necessarily designated by
more descriptive terms, such as "transferable share," "investment
contract," and "in general any interest or instrument commonly
known as a security." We cannot read out of the statute those general
descriptive designations merely because more specific ones may have
been used to reach some kinds of documents ... IThe reach of the
Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also
reached if it be proved ... that they were widely offered or dealt
in under terms or courses of dealing which established their character
in commerce as "investment contracts," .... 27
The Joiner decision was the antithesis of literalism. The Court emphasized
the point wherein the investors' "economic interest" focused, not the interest
in land, but the prospect of a test well being drilled in the vicinity: "the
transaction as the thread
undertaking to drill a well runs through the whole
28
upon which everybody's beads were strung."
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.29 articulated a connotative definition of investment contract, namely, "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party.1 30 The Court found that in
combination two items not securities, real estate and contracts for services,
could become an investment contract:
But the term
The term "investment contract" is undefined ....
was common in many state "blue sky" laws in existence prior to the
adoption of the federal statute and ... had been broadly construed
by state courts so as to afford the investing public a full measure of
for substance and emphasis was
protection. Form was disregarded
31
placed upon economic reality.
To the Court, an investment contract "embodies a flexible rather than a
static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others
32
on the promise of profits."

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

320 U.S. 344 (1943).
SEC v. Joiner Co., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
Id. at 348.
328 U.S. 293 (1946).
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
Id. at 298, relying on, inter alia, State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937

(Minn. 1920).
32. Id. at 299.
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In Tcherepnin v. Knight33 the Court applied an expansive economic
realities reading to other items listed in the statutory definition of "security."
Savings and loan withdrawable capital shares were securities under expansive
readings of "stock," "certificate of interest or participation in any profit
sharing agreement," or "investment contract." The Court prefaced its findings
with more general remarks:
[W]e are guided by the familiar canon of statutory construction that
remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its
purposes. The Securities Exchange Act quite clearly falls into the
category of remedial legislation.... Finally, we are reminded that,
in searching for the meaning and scope of the word "security" in
the Act, form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis
should be on economic realityA4
Lower federal courts became imbued with these nearly somatic sentiments.
For example, with economic realities in mind, the federal courts expanded
the definition of investment contract to include schemes in which the promoter
or third party's efforts were "primarily" or "substantially," as opposed to
"solely," responsible for the gains of the venture. And those gains were
measured as "any economic benefit" rather than simply traditional profits.
In an era of tax shelter investments, the economic benefit refinement was
necessary because tax laws gave high bracket taxpayers incentives to purchase
investments generating paper losses. As to the former, the courts asked whose
efforts were "the undeniably significant ones." 3 Otherwise, by requiring
nominal efforts on an investor's part, a promoter could escape application
36
of securities laws' registration and antifraud rules.
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman37 marks the turning point
of the broad investment contract approach. Although literally "stock" and
"shares," shares in a low and middle income housing cooperative were held
to be neither stock nor an investment contract. Mr. Justice Powell took a
1920s view ill-suited for a world of modem tax shelter schemes. He held that
for investment contract purposes "[b]y profits, the Court has meant either

33. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
34. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
35. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973).
36. See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
Some state courts did federal courts one better. They held an item to be a security when
the investment of money in a common enterprise produced a social or recreational rather than
an economic benefit. Or at least that was true when the investment constituted the very "risk
capital" of the venture. In that instance, the increased risk that the golf course, or recreational
real estate facility, or tennis club might never be built justified application of the securities laws.

See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor, J.). Another
early case is State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Haw. 1971). These state court

decisions in turn influenced the federal courts. See discussion infra notes 267-68 and accompanying
text.
37. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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capital appreciation... or a participation in earnings.... ,,38
He rejected an
argument that a promoter's structure for a transaction, a structure that
produced favorable tax treatment, could
be the "efforts of others" leading
39
to a finding of investment contract.
Overall, however, Justice Powell rejected any literal approach:
We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present transaction
... must be considered a security transaction simply because the
statutory definition of a security included the words "any... stock."
Respondents' reliance on Joineras support for a "literal approach"
to defining a security is misplaced.
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not wholly
dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly irrelevant to
the decision whether it is a security. There may be occasions when
the use of a traditional name such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead
a purchaser justifiably to assume that the federal securities laws
40
apply.
Forman is a case filled with doctrinal difficulties. For example, introducing purchaser's intent inserted a subjective element into the objective process
of determining the presence of the various elements of the investment contract
definition. Mr. Justice Powell's antiquated view of profits, and substitution
of his view for the "any economic benefit" approach that had been evolving,
was also overly restrictive and capable of causing mischief in the lower courts.
Fortunately, the lower courts did not adopt this restricted view and allow tax
shelter investment schemes to escape securities law coverage.
For over thirty years, though, through Joiner, Howey, Tcherepnin, and
Forman, the Supreme Court's emphasis had been the same-economic realities
and the remedial purposes of the securities laws. The Court, followed by
lower courts, maintained that focus by using a broad application of the
investment contract definition, both as a primary tool and as a crosscheck
when litigation involved substantial issues involving application of items
specifically enumerated in the statutory list.
B.

"Stock" and the Literal Approach-An Analysis of the Landreth
Decision

The Supreme Court's articulation of an economic realities approach in
41
Forman became the basis for the so-called "sale of business" doctrine.

38. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 752 (1975).

39. See id. at 855 & n.20 (reasoning that "[e]ven if these tax deductions were considered
profits, they would not be the type associated with a security investment since they do not result
from the managerial efforts of others").
40. Id. at 848-50.
41. For a detailed discussion of the development of the "sale of business" doctrine, see
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Under that doctrine, sales of stock effected as part of "negotiated transactions
involving the sale of control of a business" 42 were not held to be subject to
the securities laws. Although involving "stock,"

an instrument explicitly

included within the literal definition of "security," courts refused to adopt a
literal reading and instead adopted an economic realities approach. 43
Using an economic realities approach, courts and commentators reasoned
that the securities laws should not apply to transactions involving a transfer
of a controlling interest to a party intending to participate actively in the
ownership and management of the company. 44 Regulatory intervention was
not necessary because such a purchaser was expected to have sufficient
bargaining power to protect herself.4 Furthermore, it was arbitrary for the

securities laws to apply when such control transactions were structured as
stock sales, and not when structured as asset sales. 46 This elevated form over
substance.
The United States Supreme Court's decisions in Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth47 and Gould v. Ruefenacht" rejected this economic realities analysis
and instead adopted a literal approach. In Landreth, the Court refused to
uphold the "sale of business" doctrine and allowed the purchaser of one

hundred percent of the stock of a privately-held business to sue the seller for
Stephen J. Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional
Context-Based Analysis for Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAw. 929 (1984); Irving P.
Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business" Doctrine Under the. Federal
Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 637 (1982).
42. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 699 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. See, e.g., Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1981). But see
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) (refusing to examine economic realities in face
of literal application of statute to stock).
44. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that securities laws
apply to investors or passive owners, not entrepreneurs or active owners); Frederiksen, 637 F.2d
1147 at 1150 (citing difference between commercial transaction and investment transaction);
William J. Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-OrientedContextual Approach
to Investment ContractAnalysis, 33 EmoRy L.J. 311, 370-71 (1984) (suggesting that investor who
acquires controlling interest in business does not need securities laws' protection); Robert B.
Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Security: Why PurchasingAll of a Company's Stock
is Not a Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 225, 240-41 (1982) (same).
45. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 698 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "I believe that Congress
wanted to protect investors who do not have access to inside information and who are not in a
position to protect themselves from fraud by obtaining appropriate contractual warranties");
Easley, supra note 41, at 967-68 (suggesting that when parties have equal bargaining power,
investor is shielded by "self-interest").
46. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "it is only a matter of
interest to the parties whether the transaction takes the form of a sale of stock or a sale of
assets and the decision usually hinges on matters that are irrelevant to the federal securities
laws.. ."); Carney, supra note 44, at 370-71 (finding no meaningful distinction between stock
and asset sales). But see Dennis S. Karjala, Realigning Federal and State Roles in Securities
Regulation Through the Definition of a Security, 1982 U. In. L. Ray. 413, 426 (arguing that
purchase of stock requires greater protection since investigation of enterprise is more difficult
than examination of assets).
47. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
48. 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
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a sale without registration and for material misrepresentations and omissions
under the federal securities laws. Gouldwas a similar case, involving, however,
the transfer of only fifty percent of the outstanding stock of a privately-held
business. In rejecting the "sale of business" doctrine and its underlying
economic realities approach, the Court stated that "where an instrument
bears the label 'stock' and possesses all of the characteristics typically associated with stock . . ., a court will not be required to look beyond the
character of the instrument to the economic substance of the transaction to
determine whether the stock is a 'security' within the meaning of the Acts." 49
Therefore, the Court concluded, "the plain meaning of the statutory defmition
mandates that the stock be treated as 'securities' subject to the coverage of
the Acts.""
Literalism prevailed over economic realities. However, unlike the more
strident literalist opinions of recent vintage, 5' the Court attempted to vindicate
its plain meaning interpretation by reference to legislative intent and to policy
considerations. 2 Although there are several aspects to the policy discussions
in the opinion, one central theme stands out.5 3 To the Court, the public
expectation that an instrument denominated as "stock" will be subject to the
securities laws justifies a literal approach to stock. As the Court stated,
"traditional stock 'represents to many people, both trained and untrained in
business matters, the paradigm of a security.' ... Thus persons trading in
traditional stock have a high expectation that their activities are governed by
the Acts."54
It is questionable, however, whether this same public expectation holds
true in the context of a privately negotiated transfer of control. Furthermore,
whether or not there was such an expectation, following the Landreth decision,
parties are now required to accept an antifraud warranty into their transaction
if structured as a sale of stock. The mandatory application of the antifraud

49. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 704 (1985) (citations omitted). See also Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1985).
50. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 687.
51. Professor Eskridge has identified a trend from a "soft" plain meaning approach, where
the Court invoked traditional arguments of legislative intent and policy to buttress its plain
meaning interpretations, to a "harder" plain meaning rule, in which the Court refuses to go
beyond the words at all. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rnv.
621 (1990).
52. Another mollifying aspect is the Court's attempt to accommodate the Forman opinion
into its literalist approach. As we shall see in Part V., infra, in the case of general partnerships,
some federal courts have taken literalism to justify a refusal to go beyond the label given to the

instrument in question by the parties. The Court in Landreth, however, held that a court must
still determine whether an instrument is what it purports to be before the literal application of

the securities laws to such type of instrument will ensue. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686-87.
53. For a discussion and critique of several other aspects of the decision, see Lawrence
Page, Note, Even After Reves, Securities Do Not Have Families:Returning to Economic and
Legal Realities Through a ConnotativeDefinition of a Security, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 249, 278-

88.
54. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 693 (1985) (citation omitted) (quoting
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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rule will at times conflict with private preferences, and thus impose an
inefficiency.
This inefficiency becomes evident upon a critical examination of the
assumption that any party to a stock sale will expect to have available the
antifraud remedy under the federal securities laws. 55 Remembering that the
buyer of an asset with warranties must pay more than one who purchases
the asset on an "as is, where is" basis, it is easy to imagine a buyer who
would prefer to forego a warranty because of its cost.56 The mandatory
application of the antifraud warranty to all stock transactions imposes this

cost despite the preference, thus creating the inefficiency. Regulatory interference with private preferences is generally discouraged and must be justi58
fied.
The Supreme Court offered a justification based on predictability. The
linchpin to application of the "sale of business" doctrine is a determination
that the stock sale was effected as part of a transfer of control. The Court

concluded that the'need to determine whether control was being transferred
"inevitably would lead to difficult questions of line-drawing." 5 9 The indeter-

minacy of the analysis would pose two burdens.
First, the Court assumes that an analysis of control will threaten the
predictability of application of the federal securities laws, disserving private

parties in the planning and negotiation of their transactions.6° But as we have
seen, the clear predictability offered by the Landreth rule comes at the expense
of private preference. If, on the other hand, the Court offered an interpretation that allowed private parties to choose whether or not an affirmative

antifraud warranty would govern their relationship, predictability would also
be served. 6' Under such an approach, the issues would become whether or
55. But see Prentice & Roszkowski, supra note 19, at 490-91 (arguing that choice of stock
sale, instead of other transaction structures, indicates expectation of availability of federal securities
laws protection).
56. Such a buyer may have a greater capacity to bear the risk than the seller, and therefore
values the warranty less than the premium the seller requires to offer it.
57. The inefficiency arises also in less stark, not all-or-nothing examples since the parties
may accept an antifraud warranty but may wish to negotiate its specific terms-such as time
periods, materiality definitions, deductibles and maximum recoveries-so that it varies from the
warranty imposed under federal law.
Although generally parties may not waive application of the federal securities laws, one
commentator has suggested that parties to a negotiated stock sale might avoid application of a
federal antifraud warranty by explicitly waiving such a warranty in the agreement of sale, thereby
undercutting any claim of reliance by the purchaser necessary to pursue a Rule lOb-5 action. See
Easley, supra note 41, at 973-74. Another set of commentators has argued that any party seeking
such a waiver should be presumed to be engaging in fraud. See Prentice & Roszkowski. supra
note 19, at 517.
58. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with PrivatePreferences, 53 U. CHI.
L. Rnv. 1129 (1986).
59. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 696 (1985).
60. See id.; Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 706 (1985). See also Hazen, supra note
19, at 406.
61. Such an approach was offered by Judge Posner in Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th
Cir. 1982). He suggested that the "sale of business" doctrine should presumptively apply if more
than fifty percent of a company's stock was being transferred. Id. at 203.
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not the private choice should be respected or whether paternalism is warranted.
These are precisely the kinds of questions one would expect to occupy a
court that is determining the scope of a regulatory statute.
Perhaps the Court's more telling justification comes from the second
assumed result of unpredictability in the definition of control, the prospect
of "extensive discovery and litigation."' 2 One clear benefit of a plain meaning
approach is its simplicity of application. It asks little of a court in reaching
its decision, thus eliminating the need for extensive fact-finding. As shown
in Part III. A., this is one explanation for the use of plain meaning by
federal courts. It is an explanation that leads the authors to encourage state
courts to ignore the federal precedents.
C.

"Notes" and Reves-Reprise of Economic Realities?

1. The Early Note Cases. Federal courts have long been troubled by "too
many notes," just as was Mozart's royal patron in Amadeus. The federal
courts, however, face a surfeit of notes and problems relating thereto of a
thornier sort-promissory notes and the application of securities laws to them.
In its definition of a security, the Securities Act of 1933 flatly includes
"any note." 61 The Act then exempts from its registration requirements "[a]ny
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which arises out of a
current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for
current transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not
exceeding nine months ....
For antifraud rule purposes, however, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains section 10(b), pursuant to which
the general antifraud rule, rule lOb-5, has been adopted. That statute's
defimition of security does not include all notes. The defimition provides that,
for 1934 Act purposes, notes, drafts or bills of exchange are not securities
at all if their maturity at issue does not exceed nine months.6
This statutory thicket first appealed to poverty lawyers and consumer
advocates. Imagine the purchaser of a freezer and refrigerator who had been
the victim of a hard sell. She gave a three year installment note and a
purchase money security interest in the goods at the time of purchase. Later,
when the payments became too onerous, or buyer's remorse set in, she
consulted a clever consumer advocate attorney. He defended the seller's action
with the affirmative defense of securities fraud, alleging that the representations connected to the sale of the goods violated rule lOb-5.
Federal courts had little trouble with those early cases. Judges developed
the "commercial-investment dichotomy." If the transaction were commercial
"64

62. Gould, 471 U.S. at 705. See also Landreth, 471 U.S. at 697.
63. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1988).
64. Id. § 77c(a)(3).
65. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988). Federal
courts long ago decided that they would regard the two statute's definitions of a security as
"virtually identical." See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847, n.12

(1975).
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the securities laws did not apply. Those federal courts evaded the statute's
express inclusion of "note" within the definition of "security" by invoking
the "context clause," which prefaces the definitions section of either statute.
The context clause states "[w]hen used in this [title], unless the context
otherwise requires ... the term 'security' means any note ... ."6 The
context had to require otherwise. Commercial chaos would result if the
securities laws applied to every installment sale of a freezer, refrigerator, boat
or pickup truck.
The courts, though, continued to face an ever widening array of "notes."
In processing those cases, the commercial-investment dichotomy was not
always helpful. The test was conclusory, helpful only at the antipodes, the
pickup truck purchase on one antipode, or the three year loan of funds at
an attractive rate of interest at the other. Some courts, though, continued to
use the commercial-investment dichotomy, calling them as they saw them.6
Other courts, most notably the Second Circuit, developed what it called the
"family resemblance test." Still other courts found application of the Howey
investment contract test to be the most analytically helpful 9
2. Attempted Resolution by the Supreme Court. In Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 70 Mr. Justice Marshall attempted to resolve this split among the
circuits. The Farmers' Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma newsletter
offered to the Co-Op's 23,000 members, and other readers as well, uncollateralized and uninsured demand promissory notes. The notes' attractive feature
was that they carried a variable rate of interest that the Co-Op adjusted
monthly to keep the rate higher than the rate of local financial institutions.
Some 1600 persons chose the Co-Op notes as convenient places to park $10
million in funds. 71 When the Co-Op entered bankruptcy, note holders sued
the auditors, Ernst & Young, for aiding and abetting securities fraud. The
Eighth Circuit rejected their claim, finding that "[t]he demand nature of the
notes is very uncharacteristic of a security." '72 The court found that the
virtually instant liquidity a demand note affords was inconsistent with the
73
long term risk ordinarily associated with a security.
At the outset, Mr. Justice Marshall rejected application of the Howey
test. "To hold that a 'note' is not a 'security' unless it meets a [catchall] test
66. Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 7T. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)

-is identical. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 776 with 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a).
67. See, e.g., Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1981); American
Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. United States Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1980); United
Am. Bank of Nashville v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1980).
68. The leading case is Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d
1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
69. See, e.g., Union Nat'l Bank of Little Rock v. Farmers Bank, 786 F.2d 881 (8th Cir.
1986).
70. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
71. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 59 (1990).
72. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Reves
v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990). Pending the appeal to the Supreme ,Court, Arthur Young
& Co. merged with Ernst & Whinney to form Ernst & Young. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 59.
73. See Arthur Young, 856 F.2d at 54.
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designed for an entirely different variety of instrument," he concluded,
"'would make the Acts' enumeration of many types of instruments superfluous."' 74 Of course, thirty, forty and nearly fifty years before the Court had
held the opposite. In SEC v. Joiner, the Court held that "[w]e cannot read
out of the statute [those] general descriptive designations merely because more
specific ones have been used to reach some kinds of documents," 75 and in
Tcherepnin v. Knight the Court applied an investment contract
Howey analysis
76
to an item listed in the statutory definition as "stock.
The Reves opinion then read out the "investment versus commercial"
test as essentially the same as the "family resemblance" test it thereafter
chose to decree for lower federal courts. "A note is presumed to be a
'security' under the family resemblance test, "and that presumption may be
rebutted only by showing that the note bears a strong family resemblance (in
terms of the four factors we have identified) to one of the enumerated
categories of instrument."'' The categories of instrument clearly commercial
include "'the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by -a
mortgage on a home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a small
business or some of its assets, the note evidencing a "charactef" loan to a
bank customer, the short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts
receivable, or a note which simply formalizes open-account indebtedness
incurred in the ordinary course of business ... ?,,.78

Four factors are to enable courts to determine whether novel or uncommon notes bear a family resemblance to the enumerated items. Those factors
are indicated by Mr. Justice Marshall's stream of consciousness analysis:
First, we examine the transaction to assess the motivations that would
prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it. If the seller's
purpose is to raise money for the general use of a business enterprise
or to finance substantial investments and the buyer is interested
primarily in the profit the note is expected to generate, the instrument
is likely to be a "security." If the note is exchanged to facilitate the
purchase and sale of a minor asset or consumer good, to correct for
the seller's cash flow difficulties, or to advance some other commercial
or consumer purpose ... the note is less sensibly described as a
"security." Second, we examine the "plan of distribution" of the
instrument ....

Third, we examine the reasonable expectations of

the investing public: The Court will consider instruments to be
"securities" on the basis of such public expectations, even where an
economic analysis of the circumstances of the particular transaction

74. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64 (quoting Landreth v. Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. 681, 692
(1985)).
75. 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
76. 389 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1967).
77. Reves, 494 U.S. at 67.
78. Id. at 65 (quoting Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138
(2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, J.)).

1058

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1043

might suggest that the instruments are not "securities" .... Finally,
we examine whether some factor such as the existence of another
regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument,
thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary. 79
Applying the four factors, Mr. Justice Marshall found the Arkansas Oklahoma Co-Op notes to be securities. s0
3. Reves-A Reprise of Economic Realities? Although Mr. Justice Marshall took pains to reject application of investment contract analysis, 8s what
he wrought is very similar to the investment contract Howey analysis as it
has evolved. His first factor is "motivations that would prompt a reasonable
seller and buyer."'i2 Motivation of the seller, of course, is not helpful because
it is a constant one of obtaining the use of other people's money. The buyer's
motivation, though, can vary, principally between consumption or investment.
The first Howey element, of course, is "an investment of money.""i As has
been seen, 84 United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman highlighted motivation as the crux of the economic realities approach. If the buyer's motivation
is consumption-of housing, or of a refrigerator, or of a pickup truckrather than investment, the package or item offered is not an investment
contract and therefore not a security.
Commentators have also divined in Mr. Justice Marshall's second element,
the "plan of distribution," a cousin or sibling of the investment contract
commonality requirement:
This second factor resembles the second prong of the Howey test:
the commonality/multiplicity requirement. Both distinguish between
the loan-type transactions in which the investor has the bargaining
power to protect him- or herself in the contract from schemes in
which the investor's bargaining power is diluted by the presence of
other similarly situated investors."5

79. Id. at 66-67 (citations omitted).
80. Fortunately, Mr. Justice Marshall rejected the approach espoused by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, which can only be characterized as literalism at its worst. In his concurring opinion,
predictably joined in by Justice Scalia, the Chief Justice cited some older cases holding that a
demand promissory note is for statute of limitations purposes, due upon issue. See id. at 77
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Due upon issue means a maturity
of less than nine months. Since the Securities Act of 1934 excludes altogether from its definition
of a security notes with maturities of less than nine months, the Chief Justice would have
afforded no relief in the case. Id. at 81-82.
The opinion reflects not mere total reliance on labels alone, literalism, but literalism at its
worst, reliance on labels alone to further an unstated agenda. That agenda, of course, dating
from Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.), has been
to use every opportunity to decide securities cases for defendants and, in doing so, to prune
back ever more severely the reach and protection of the securities laws.
81. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64.
82. Id. at 66.
83. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1945).
84. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
85. Page, supra note 53, at 290.
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The third Marshall factor, the "reasonable expectations of the investing
public," seems similar to the first. If the reasonable person would expect the

protections of the securities laws to apply, the factor tips the transaction
toward a finding of security. On the other hand, as Forman taught, if the

motivation is housing, or some other consumption animus, then the reasonable
investor would not expect the securities laws' protection. .The balance tips
the opposite way.
Finally, Mr. Justice Marshall asks whether in the context in which the

note appears there exists some risk reducing factor "such as the existence of
another regulatory scheme." 8 6 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniels introduced this refinement to investment contract analysis, noting
that the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) weighed

against finding an involuntary, noncontributory pension plan interest to be a
security.88 Later, Marine Bank v. Weavers9 amplified this new factor. Marine
Bank noted the presence of depository insurance in a case involving a
certificate of deposit. Ultimately, the Court found no investment contract
and no security present. 90
The difficulty with Reves is that the similarity to Howey is not crystal

clear. Just enough dissonance exists between the two approaches that lower
courts will continue to regard "investment contract" and promissory note

analyses as separate tracks. 91 On a theoretical level, Reves will join Landreth

Timber as another obstacle to the development of an overall general working
definition of a security-what one commentator labels a "connotative definition of a security."
On the other hand, all the commentators who have closely examined
Reves and its four factors see in the analysis a reworked or rephrased
distillation of the Howey test. 93 Those observations prove that a "connotative"

86. Reves, 494 U.S. at 67.
87. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
88. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979).
89. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
90. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1982).
91. See, e.g., Page, supra note 53, at 250 (recognizing that "the Supreme court has
stumbled into a line of analysis that not only muddies the concept of a security under the
securities laws, but also does not provide the guidance necessary to accurately identify a security
in a case involving anything more than an easily identifiable instrument at either extreme"); id.
at 288 (finding that in Reves "the Court unfortunately announced an unpredictable test" and
"jumbled and misapplied the Howey elements").
92. See id. at 299.
93. See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, InterplanetaryIntelligence About PromissoryNotes as
Securities, 69 Tax. L. Ray. 383, 394 (1990) (suggesting it is not so clear that tests for notes and
for investment contracts are different); Marc. I Steinberg, Notes as Securities: Reves and Its
Implications, 51 Omao ST. L.J. 675, 679 (1990) (stating that "an argument can certainly be made
that the Howey and 'family resemblance' tests are quite similar"); Leonard J. De Pasquale,
Comment, Helping to Ameliorate the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor in the Securities Market: Reves
v. Ernst & Young, 26 Naw ENa. L. Ray. 893, 908-09 (1992) (noting that "[i]n adopting the
'family resemblance test' the Court persisted with its philosophy of examining the economic
realities of an instrument"). Page, supra note 53, at 290-91 comes to the same conclusion.
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definition lurks in the depths and that the definition is the investment contract
one. Investment contract analysis and Howey are means of probing economic
realities. They are commended to state judiciaries as the tool for doing so.
On the state level, no Landreth or other obstacle blocks the path toward
evolution of an overall definition of a security. Reves v. Ernst & Young
demonstrates that point.
III.

TBE

DEFINITION OF "SECURTY"

A.

"Stock" After Landreth in the State Courts

IN THE STATE COURTS

With few exceptions, 94 since the United States Supreme Court's decisions
in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth95 and Gould v. Ruefenacht,96 state courts
have joined in the rejection of the "sale of business" doctrine and applied
their state securities laws whenever a transaction involves stock. 97 The courts
have explained that the policy of coordination mandates adopting the Supreme
Court's literal approach. 9 This policy of harmony has outweighed even strong

94. We have found only two state court opinions which have upheld the "sale of business"
doctrine and rejected a literal application of a state securities statute to a transaction involving
stock. Cook v. Wills, 808 S.W.2d 758 (Ark. 1991) (applying combination of investment contract
and risk capital analysis to conclude that large block investment in closely-held company imparted
control, thus precluding finding of "security"); White v. Solomon, 732 P.2d 1389 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1986) (following as persuasive federal circuit court cases upholding "sale of business"
doctrine). Neither opinion indicates an awareness of the Supreme Court's opinions in Landreth
or Gould.
An intermediate appellate court in Georgia attempted an end run around the Supreme Court
holdings. In Henderson v. KMSystens, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988), the court
refused to apply the state securities act to the repurchase by the corporation of the stock held
by a 25% stockholder/employee. Although the court acknowledged that under the Landreth
rationale, the act would literally apply to "stock," it went on to hold that the court must first
determine if what the parties denominated as "stock" truly possessed the characteristics typically
associated with stock. Id. at 552-53. The court concluded that the fact that the stock in the case
was legended and therefore non-negotiable meant that it was no longer the kind of "stock"
which was intended to be included in the concept of "security." Id. at 553.The Georgia Supreme
Court ultimately overruled this sophistic evasion of the Supreme Court's reasoning. Cohen v.
William Goldberg & Co., 423 S.E.2d 231, 234 (Ga. 1992) (holding that "Limitations on the
transfer of stock in close corporations are common, but neither the small size of the corporation
nor the restrictions on transferability remove such a corporation's stock from the reach of [the
securities act]").
95. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
96. 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
97. E.g., Banton v. Hackney, 557 So. 2d 807 (Ala. 1990) (recognizing that state securities
act applies to sale of all stock of closely-held corporation); Cohen, 423 S.E.2d at 231 (same);
Kovatovich v. Barnett, 406 N.W.2d 516 (Minn. 1987) (finding repurchase of stock from 40%
shareholder/employee subject to state securities laws); Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392
N.W.2d 520 (Minn. 1986) (holding that state securities act applies to sale of 100% of private
company's stock); Barnes v. Sunderman, 453 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1990) (holding that state
securities act applies to sale of 50% of closely-held company's stock).
98. Kovatovich, 406 N.W.2d at 518 (stating that "we are required to coordinate our
interpretation of state securities laws with its federal equivalent"); Specialized Tours, Inc., 392
N.W.2d at 535 (same); Barnes, 453 N.W.2d at 796 (same).
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and specifically articulated disagreement with the Supreme Court's decisions.
For example, in a decision by the North Dakota Supreme Court in which
the court held that the state securities act would apply to the purchase of a
fifty percent interest in the stock of a closely-held corporation but found no
actionable misrepresentation, a concurring opinion expressly challenged the
logic of the United States Supreme Court's rejection of the "sale of business"
doctrine.9 The judge stated he could "divine no rational reason for distinguishing between the transfer of a business which has been incorporated and
one which is owned by an individual or partnership who have not incorporated
insofar as a fraudulent intent is concerned."'' 0 As previously discussed, the
lack of a meaningful distinction between stock and asset sales is a recurring
criticism of the Supreme Court's literal approach to stock as a security 01
Addressing the policy of coordination, the judge redefined the court's mission
not in terms of harmonization but in terms of divining the legislative intent
of the state legislature in adopting the state securities act.'02 Therefore, federal
law, as in effect at the time the federal statute was used as a model for the
state enactment, is persuasive authority; subsequent interpretations of the
federal model are not.101 Taken to its extreme, this argument sees the state
act as frozen in time, unaffected by an evolving law of securities regulation.
Taken more generously, however, it is a somewhat facile attempt to liberate
the state court from its self-imposed servitude to federal law.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has also openly chaffed under the
federal precedents. In an en banc opinion rejecting the "sale of business"
doctrine, the court wrote:
Strong legal arguments and sound policy considerations support
application of the economic reality or sale of business test in Minnesota, and were we writing on a clean slate, we would do so.
However, since the time this case was briefed in this court, the United
States Supreme Court has rejected the sale of business doctrine in
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth ... and the companion case of
Gould v. Ruefenacht .... Because of this state's statutory policy
mandating coordination of interpretation of the Minnesota Securities
Act with related federal regulations and interpretations . . ., we now
feel constrained to follow those federal cases.'0 4
The court expressed its support for the "sale of business" doctrine in
two footnotes. In one, the court gave the following list of legal arguments
and policy considerations which support the doctrine:

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

omitted).

Barnes, 453 N.W.2d at 798 (Vande WaRe, J., concurring).
Id.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
Barnes v. Sunderman, 453 N.W.2d 793, 798 (N.D. 1990) (Vande Walle, J., concurring).
Id.
Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392 N.W.2d 520, 535 (Minn. 1985) (footnotes
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For example, (1) the "unless the context otherwise requires" language in [the statute] permits a construction that the act does not
apply to the sale of a business through a stock transfer when the
stock is merely a method of vesting ownership and not the sale of
an investment instrument; (2) a holding that a sale of 100 percent of
the stock in a business is the sale of a security, while the sale of 100
percent of the assets in a business is not, exalts form over substance;
(3) a purchaser of 100 percent of stock in a negotiated face-to-face
transaction does not need the protection of the Minnesota Securities
Act because the antifraud provisions most often implicated in "sale
of business" cases can be written into the sales agreement ...; (4)

adequate and parallel state common law causes of action exist to
give a remedy for fraud and misrepresentation claims;, and (5) most
parties to a sale of a business through a 100 percent stock transfer
would never contemplate that the Minnesota Securities Act would
apply to that type of transaction.0 5
In a second footnote the court approvingly discussed Justice Stevens'
dissents in Landreth and Gould.'°0 The court made a particular-note of Justice
Stevens' view that Congress could not have intended the i federal securities
laws "'to govern the private sale of a substantial ownership interest in these
operating businesses simply because the transactions were structured as sales
of stock instead of assets." ' " °7 The opinion later asserted the same point
concerning the intent of the Minnesota legislature. "We question whether the
legislature intended, or even contemplated, a result that, even in the absence
of an intent to defraud, would burden the seller with such punitive-like
liability damages.'
Nevertheless, despite its open critique of the Supreme
Court's rulings, its doubts as to the legislative intent of the body that adopted
the statute, and even its conclusion that "application of the act leads to an
inequitable result,'' °9 the court followed the federal rule."10
A Washington court has also rejected the "sale of business" doctrine
and applied the state securities act to a private sale of one hundred percent
of the stock of a small business."' However, unlike the cases noted above
that followed federal interpretations, a 1973 decision from the Washington
Supreme Court holding that the state act applied to face-to-face negotiations
outside the securities markets for the sale of stock of a closely-held corporation
was the basis of the Washington court decision. 1 2 In a subsequent decision
'0

105. Id. at 535 n.12.

106. Id. at 535 n.13.
107. Id. (quoting Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreti, 471 U.S. 681, 700 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
108. Id. at 535 n.14.
109. Id. at 535.

110. Id. And felt constrained to do so again the following year. Kovatovich v. Barnett, 406
N.W.2d 516, 518 (Minn. 1987).
111. Aspelund v. Olerich, 784 P.2d 179 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
112. Id. at 181 (citing Clausing v. DeHart, 515 P.2d 982 (Wash. 1973)).
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involving a limited partnership interest, the court reexamined the earlier
Washington Supreme Court decision." 3 Although the court had reviewed
federal precedents to determine that the limited partnership interest was not
a security because of the extent of the limited partner's practical control of
the venture," 4 it nevertheless decided that the conclusion under federal law
might not be determinative under state law because earlier state court decisions
evidenced a different purpose for the state statute." 5 The court suggested that
the state law's different purpose-greater focus on investor protection-would
allow application of the statute even in privately negotiated transactions.
Thus, even though the result of the state courts is the same, the Washington
court's decision to reject the "sale of business" doctrine is different from
the other state courts'. Whether or not one agrees with the substantive policy
of applying the securities laws to privately negotiated sales of businesses, the
basis for the decision-the state's policy-was correct. The basis for decision
in the other state courts-a policy of harmonization with federal decisionswas not.
B.

"Notes" After Reves in the State Courts

State courts did not extend the logic of Landreth to transactions involving
notes. Although, like "stock," "notes" are specifically included in the
definition of "security" in state securities acts," 6 the courts eschewed a literal
approach and instead approached each case with some version of an economic
realities test. For example, the California Supreme Court reversed a lower
court's literal application of the state securities laws to a transaction involving
notes given to an employee/investor." 7 The court wrote:
The list of instruments which come within the statutory definition of
a "security" is an expansive one. However, the cases have adhered
to the principle that substance governs over form. "[A] literal interpretation [of the statute] has been uniformly eschewed when to do
so would appear to exceed any legitimate legislative purpose." ...
Thus, the "critical question" the courts have sought to resolve in
these cases is whether a transaction falls within the regulatory purpose
of the law regardless of whether it involves an instrument which
comes within the literal language of the statute." 8
Given this unequivocal rejection of the literal approach, it is peculiar that
the court cites Landreth for the proposition that "[tihe high court has recently
reaffirmed its commitment to the principle that substance governs over

113. Shinn v. Thrust IV, Inc., 786 P.2d 285, 298 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
114. Id.
115. Id.

116. UNrEosu SEcuxn'ws AcT (1956) § 4010), 7B U.L.A. 580 (1958); UlNoRm SEcuRmrTs
AcT (1985) § 101(16), 7B U.L.A. 75 (1993 Supp.)
117. People v. Figueroa, 715 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1986).
118. Id. at 694 (quoting People v. Schock, 199 Cal. Rptr. 327, 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
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form."" 9 Unlike the Supreme Court's treatment of stock in Landreth, the
California high court remanded the case for a determination of whether the
note involved was a security under an economic realities test similar to the
traditional Howey analysis.
2
The rejection of a literal approach was pervasive in the state courts.1 0
The post-Landreth decisions regarding notes in the state courts reflect the
same melange of purpose-based, economic realities tests that was found in
the federal appellate opinions.' 2 ' As noted by the Court in Reves, the Circuit

Courts were following four different versions of an economic realities test1) the "investment" versus "commercial" dichotomy test; 2) the "family
resemblance" test; 3) the Howey test; and 4) the risk capital test.' Examples

of each approach are found in state court decisions since 1985.
The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits adopted the "investment/commercial" test.'2 State courts in Delaware,- 4 Michigan,-1 and
Minnesota 26 have followed this approach as well. The Second Circuit produced the "family resemblance" test' 27 which a Massachusetts court followed. 28 Despite the explicit statements by the Court in Landreth limiting
the Howey test to investment contracts,

case.130

29

the Eight Circuit applied that test

to notes in the Reves
Prior to the Landreth decision, the District of
Columbia Circuit had also applied the Howey test to notes,' and a number

119. Id. at 694-95 n.26.
120. Leyva v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ("All California
courts ... have rejected a literal interpretation.... ."); Turchi v. Salaman, 1990 Del. Ch. Laxis
34, at *19 (Del. Ch. 1990) ("courts look to the economic reality and substance of a transaction,
rather than to its form and legal terminology"); Ansorge v. Kellogg, 431 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1988) ("We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present transaction ... must
be considered a security transaction simply because the statutory definition of security includes
the words 'any note .... '); Caucus Distributors, Inc. v. Commissioner of Commerce, 422
N.W.2d 264, 270 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) ("A literal interpretation is, however, inappropriate for
the term 'note'. . . ."); Computer Concepts, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Brandt, 780 P.2d 249,

252 (Ore. Ct. App. 1989) ("Although [the statute] includes 'note' within the definition of a
security, the transaction must be evaluated in light of the 'economic realities"').
121. See supra Part II. C.
122. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63-65 (1990); Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 6,
at 880.
123. Loss & SEaumAN, supra note 6, at 881 & 881 n.35.

124. Turchi v. Salaman, 1990 Del. Ch. LExis 34 (Del. Ch. 1990).
125. Noyd v. Claxton, Morgan, Flockhart & VanLiere, 463 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990); Ansorge v. Kellogg, 431 N.W.2d 402 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
126. Caucus Distributors, Inc. v. Commissioner of Commerce, 422 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988).
127. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
See also Loss & SEaoimAN, supra note 6, at 888-90.
128. Dinjian v. Dinjian, 495 N.E.2d 882 (Mass. Ct. App. 1986).
129. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1985).
130. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub noma. Reves v.
Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).

131. Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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of state courts also took the same approach.132 Finally, at least two state
34
courts have followed the Ninth Circuit"' in applying the risk capital test.
With the Supreme Court's decision in Reves, the seeming cacophony of
approaches appears to have ended. The state courts have uniformly adopted
the Supreme Court's approach. 35 Again the state court opinions cite the same
policy of harmonization as the basis for their decisions to follow the federal
precedent. 36 There is, however, an important difference between the acceptance of the Reves test for "notes" and the Landreth test for "stock." As
discussed above, 137 although the family resemblance test adopted in Reves
was described as a "literal" approach,1 38 the Supreme Court's opinion actually
has more of an economic realities emphasis and seems in fact to sharply
circumscribe Landreth's literalist interpretational methodology. For-the state
courts, at least, the four factor test announced in Reves is similar to the
analysis they previously performed under various labels such as Howey, risk
capital, or investment/commercial dichotomy.139 In fact, the state court opi-

132. E.g., People v. Figueroa, 715 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1986); Computer Concepts, Inc. Profit
Sharing Plan v. Brandt, 780 P.2d 249 (Ore. Ct. App. 1989); State of Washington v. Philips,
741 P.2d 24 (Wash. 1987).
133. See Loss & SaucmAN, supra note 6, at 885-88.
134. Grand Prairie Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Worthen Bank & Trust, Co. N.A., 769 S.W.2d
20 (Ark. 1989); People v. Miller, 238 Cal. Rptr. 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
135. E.g., Caucus Distrib., Inc. v. Dep't of Commerce & Economic Dev., 793 P.2d 1048
(Alaska 1990) (holding that promissory notes issued by Lyndon LaRouche campaign are securities
under Reves/famnily resemblance test); Caucus Distrib., Inc. v. Maryland Sec. Comm'r, 577 A.2d
783 (Md. 1990) (same); Chrysler First Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Kimbrough, Carson & Woods, 1991
Tex. App. Laxis 2534 (1991) (holding that second lien mortgage notes are securities under Reves
test); Ascher v. Commonwealth, 408 S.E.2d 906 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that promissory
notes issued by LaRouche campaign are securities under Reves/family resemblance test); State
of Washington v. Saas, 792 P.2d 554 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that promissory notes are
not securities under Reves test), rev'd on other grounds, 820 P.2d 505 (Wash. 1991). See also
Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Treatment of Reves "Notes" and Other "Securities" under
State Blue Sky Laws, 47 Bus. LAw. 321, 325-29 (1991).
136. E.g., Caucus Distrib., 577 A.2d at 788 (stating that "we consider the interpretation of
[the] same term by federal courts"); Chrysler First Fin. Serv. Corp., 1991 Tex. App. Lxius 2534,
at *5 (stating that "Texas courts look to federal decisions to interpret the Texas Securities Act");
Saas, 792 P.2d at 555-56 (referring to federal law to determine meaning of "security").
137. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
138. See Loss & SnuamAN, supra note 6, at 889; Warren, supra note 134, at 323.
139. In this regard, it is interesting to note the comments made by the one state court which
did not follow Reves in a recent case involving notes. In State v. Tober, 826 P.2d 1199 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1991), the court noted the Reves decision but elected to rely on an earlier Ninth Circuit
precedent-Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.
1978)-which used the risk capital test. Tober, 826 P.2d at 1202 n.5. The court stated: "The
United States Supreme Court has recently rejected the Amfac test, adopting the Second Circuit's
'family resemblance' test ....
Although the Reves test has not been briefed in this matter, we
note that we would similarly find sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions under
the Reves test." Id. The court goes on to express its concerns that tests like the Reves test, are
unconstitutionally vague, at least in the context of criminal securities law prosecutions. Id. at
1203-05. This is an interesting view of what many see as the most plain meaning of the tests for
notes as securities.
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nions appear largely to ignore the "literal" portion of the Reves analysis.
None invokes either the presumption or the family resemblance list of nonsecurities in its reasoning. Each opinion immediately turns to the four factor
test, allowing the case-by-case, purpose-based aspect of Reves to subsume the
vestige of a literal approach. It is therefore not surprising that the state courts
have had little difficulty in adopting the new federal rule for notes. They
simply are doing what they had. done previously.
C.

The Ongoing Power of Purpose-Based,Economic Realities Tests in the
State Courts-The Dominance of Howey

The state courts' easy assimilation of the Reves decision into their general
economic realities approach is not surprising. Harmonization has rarely posed
any conflict because state courts have routinely read federal court opinions
as supporting their fact-specific, purpose-based approach to application of
their state securities laws. For example, in a recent opinion, the Supreme
Court of Washington appeared oblivious to the United States Supreme Court's
literalist utterances and instead quoted Howey in stating: "The United States
Supreme Court has declared that the definition of a security 'embodies a
flexible rather than static principle, one that is capable of adaption to meet
the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of
money of others on the promise of profits.""') 4
The Court of Appeals of New York cited Landreth as support for the
following decidedly non-literalist statements:
Whether the label of a particular interest and the description given
to it by the parties brings it literally within one of the enumerated
categories in [the state statute] is not determinative. We must go
beyond the "literal test" and-applying a flexible and adaptable
approach-"look to the function of [the investment at hand], to
search for substance over form with emphasis on economic reality",
to see if it displays the characteristics of "securities" in the general
sense of the term .... 141
Although the United States Supreme Court may have restricted the economic
realities test of Howey to the case of investment contracts, 42 this restriction
has had little impact, except in cases involving "stock,"' 43 on the state courts'
enthusiasm for an economic realities approach.
In state courts, an economic realities test such as the four-prong Howey
test, or, now in the case of "notes," the four-prong test from the second

140. Cellular Eng'g, Ltd. v. O'Neill, 820 P.2d 941, 946 (Wash. 1991) (quoting SEC V. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946)).
141. All Seasons Resorts, Inc. v. Abrams, 497 N.E.2d 33, 36 (N.Y. 1986) (finding that sale
of memberships for nonexclusive use of campgrounds is not security since there is no expectation
of profit or other financial gain).
142. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1985).
143. See discussion supra Part III. A.
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part of the Reves opinion, 144 still dominate the inquiry into whether a
transaction involves a security. 45 The preponderance of "investment contract"
cases partly explains the resilience of the Howey test. The simpler cases of
stock and notes are less frequently the subject of dispute. The issue of whether
the securities laws apply is most often posed when a case involves a novel
investment scheme. Schemes found to be securities under the Howey test in
recent state court proceedings included such varied investment devices as loan
47
pools,14' pyramid marketing schemes, arrangements for gold speculation,'4

condominiums, 149 franchise agreements, 50 partnerships,1"' lottery pools, 5 2 oil
and gas leases,' and other miscellaneous "get rich quick" schemes.'5 Since
none of these schemes falls literally within any of the categories in the
definition of "security," more deliberative analysis was required.
However, the sheer number of investment contract cases alone do not
explain the continuing vitality of the Howey doctrine. Repeatedly, state courts
begin their analysis with the statement that the overriding purpose of the

state securities act is to empower the court to protect the defrauded investor.
For example, the Kansas Supreme Court began one opinion with the observation: "The purpose of the Kansas Securities Act is to place the traffic of
promoting and dealing in speculative securities under rigid governmental

regulation and control to protect investors, thereby preventing, so far as
possible, the sale of fraudulent and worthless speculative securities.""'s Similar

144. See discussion supra Part III. B.
145. In California, the risk capital test appears to have replaced the Howey test as the
economic realities test of choice. See, e.g., People ex rel. Christine Bender v. Wind River Mining
Project, 269 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Cal. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that sale of "gold production and
delivery agreements" to finance new gold recovery method is security under risk capital analysis);
People v. Stewart, 227 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that fraudulent sale of
discounted accounts receivable to finance gold mine venture is security under risk capital test).
146. Griffin v. Jackson, 759 P.2d 839 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Jenkins v. Jacobs, 748 P.2d
1318 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). But see Rzepka v. Michael, 431 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that factoring of accounts receivable does not involve security).
147. People v. Graham, 210 Cal. Rptr. 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Cooper, 421
N.W.2d 177 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Jones, 453 N.W.2d 447 (Neb. 1990).
148. Martin v. ITM/Int'l Trading & Mktg. Ltd., 494 A.2d 451 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). But
see Moreland v. Dep't of Corp., 239 Cal. Rptr. 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
149. State v. Shade, 726 P.2d 864 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986). But see Dufour v. U.S. Home
Corp., 581 So. 2d 765 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
150. Ball v. Volken, 741 P.2d 958 (Utah 1987).
151. See cases discussed infra Part V. G.
152. 537721 Ontario, Inc. v. Mays, 780 P.2d 1126 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (pool to buy lottery
tickets); Cellular Eng'g, Ltd. v. O'Neill, 820 P.2d 941 (Wash. 1991) (FCC cellular phone license
lottery).
153. Daleiden v. Wiggans Oil Co., 517 .N.E.2d 1059 (II. 1987); Witter v. Buchanan, 476
N.E.2d 1123 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985).
154. Activator Supply Co. v. Wurth, 722 P.2d 1081 (Kan. 1986) (cottage industry scheme
involving sale of "activators" to be added to milk to produce lactic cultures which would
supposedly be resold). Cf. Vairo v. Clayden, 734 P.2d 110 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (tax shelter
involving master videotapes to be distributed to television stations).
155. Activator Supply, 722 P.2d at 1086.
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statements of the courts' focus on investor protection are found throughout
the decision.'5 6 Commentators have compared this state court focus on the
individual investor with a perceived focus in federal courts on system-wide
market iritegrity and a growing antagonism to private litigation to vindicate
individual harm. 5 7 The contrast between the state courts' emphasis on the
individual investor and the federal focus is illuminating.
If a court views itself as a forum for adjudicating claims by private
parties that were defrauded by an investment scheme which, because of both
the passivity and lack of sophistication expected on the part of the investor,
requires the heightened protection of the state securities laws, we would expect
a preference for flexible analyses. Just as it does in a conventional tort or
contract dispute, the court, exercising its common-law function, renders justice
in the case at hand. In that setting, bright-line tests such as a literal approach
are suspect; they too often yield absurd results in the individual case. Where,
however, the import of the issue of defining "security" is more concerned
with issues unrelated to individual justice, a literalist approach may be
preferred. 5
IV.
A.

A COMMON-LAW

APPROACH FOR COMMON-LAW COURTs

The Case Against Deference-The Function of Plain Meaning in the

Federal Courts
The Supreme Court's adoption of a literalist approach to the definition

of "security" is part of a larger movement in its jurisprudence of statutory
156. E.g., Probst v. State, 807 P.2d 279, 288 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (Lane, J., concurring)
(stating that "[tihis analysis squares with the purpose of the State Securities Act which is to
protect people from schemes ... which defraud the public"); Shinn v. Thrust IV, Inc., 786
P.2d 285, 298 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that 'while the purpose of federal securities laws
is to maintain the integrity of the secondary securities markets and to enforce disclosure, the
[state act] is intended to protect investors') (quoting Haberman v. WPPSS, 744 P.2d 1032,
1049 (Wash. 1987)).
157. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Collateral ParticipantLiability Under State Securities
Laws, 19 PEPP. L. Ray. 1027 (1992); Marc I. Steinberg, The Emergence of State Securities Laws:
Partly-Sunny Skies for Investors, 62 U. CN. L. Ray. (1993) (forthcoming). But see Eric A.
Chiappinelli, Reinventing a Security: Arguments for a Public Interest Definition, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. Rav. 957 (1992) (arguing that federal courts' definition of "security" serves investor
protection function and ignores aggregate market needs).
158. While this Article seeks in Part IV. A. infra to explain the literalist approach in the
federal courts as part of a larger, uniquely federal jurisprudential concern generally associated
with Justice Scalia's textualist methodology for statutory interpretation, there is another, somewhat
related distinction between the function of the term "security" in the state and federal regimes.
While private rights of action under the federal securities statutes have been firmly established,
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) ("The existence of this implied
remedy is simply beyond peradventure."), they are creatures of judicial making. As written, the
federal securities laws do not provide a general private right of action for securities fraud.
Therefore, the function of the definition was primarily to establish the jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Although state statutes also empower local securities
administrators, the jurisdictional function of the defrmition is not as important as in the federal
regime. This distinction might be of only historical interest since private access to the statute's
remedies is now the dominant concern in both federal and state courts. In this regard, it is
interesting to note the Court's discussion of the implied right of action under Rule 10b-5 in
Landreth. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694 n.7 (1985).
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interpretation. Although long a part of the Court's arsenal of interpretive
tools, the plain meaning approach took on a new importance in the 1980s.
Literalism is the most recent response to the Court's lifelong struggle with
its proper role in our constitutional system of government. It is an answer
to the Court's questioning of the limits of legitimate judicial law-making or
59
common-law powers in the federal system.
Professor Merrill framed the issue in writing:
The Supreme Court recently declared that "[flederal courts, unlike
state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess
a general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision."
Almost simultaneously, however, the Court recognized "the need and
authority in some limited areas to formulate what has come to be
known as 'federal common law."' Pronouncements to the effect that
the common law powers of federal courts are limited or restricted,
but that they nevertheless exist in certain circumstances, clearly presuppose some standard or norm for distinguishing legitimate from
illegitimate exercises in judicial lawmaking. 160
Defining federal common law as all rules pronounced by courts which
"are not found on the face of an authoritative federal text,"' 161 Professor
Merrill argues for a very restricted common-law power for federal courts. He
bases his views on the constitutional principles of federalism, separation of
powers and electoral accountability. 162 These same constitutional concerns are
seen as motivating the Court's literalist solution to its question of the legitimate
limits to judicial law-making.'0

159. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo.
L.J. 281, 289-90 (1989) (criticizing literalism as response to concerns of legislative supremacy);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 3
(1985) (suggesting that "federal common law is legitimate insofar as it is the product of textual
interpretation"); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L.
REv. 405, 415 (1989) (explaining that textualism is device premised on concepts of judicial
legitimacy); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in
the Supreme Court, 95 HRv.L. REv. 892, 902 (1982) (stating that "the Court in adopting the
clear-statement model seeks ...to restore judicial legitimacy by anchoring interpretation in a
literalist reading of statutory terms").
160. Merrill, supra note 159, at 7-8 (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,
312 (1981), and Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981))(footnotes
omitted).
161. Id.at 7.
162. Id.at 3. Professor Merrill also identifies the Rules of Decision Act as a statutory basis
for a restriction on judicial law-making. Id. at 27-32.
163. Numerous commentators have seen the literalist approach as motivated by one or more
of the three constitutional factors identified by Professor Merrill. See, e.g.,
Farber, supra note
159, at 283 (discussing separation of powers); Sunstein, supra note 159, at 415 (discussing
separation of powers and electoral accountability); Note, supra note 159, at 900 (discussing
separation of powers).
More recent commentary has focused on Justice Scalia's "new textualism" which Professor
Eskridge has labelled a "harder plain meaning rule." See Eskridge, supra note 51, at 656-60
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These constitutional concerns which motivate the Court's plain meaning
approach are unique to federal courts. These issues are either irrelevant to
or have different implications for a state court. Therefore, when a state court
blindly follows the Supreme Court's literalist approach to the definition of a
"security,"

it is needlessly assimilating a uniquely federal jurisprudential
debate. To see this it is important to consider each of the three articulated
constitutional concerns and their applicability to state courts.

The constraint of federalism is based on the constitutional concept of a
federal government of limited, enumerated powers contrasted with state

governments to whom (along with the body politic) all nonenumerated powers
are reserved. 1 4 To the extent that federal courts exercise expansive commonlaw powers, they appear to encroach on the reserved powers of the states. A
limited textual interpretation preserves state rights because statutes are adopted
either within the enumerated powers of the federal government or otherwise
with state acquiescence through the states synecdochic participation in the

legislative process. ie Federalism, however, is simply not a concern when
considering state court action. 6 As instruments of state government, state
courts' use of an expansive common-law approach does not impinge on state
rights, and thus there is no constitutional concern.

Unlike federalism, however, separation of powers and electoral accountability as constraints on judicial activism are not unique to federal courts.
As one commentator summarized the concern, "In a democratic system, with

an electorally accountable legislature and separated powers, it is said to be
the appropriate and indeed constitutionally prescribed role of the courts to
apply legislative commands; it is thus impermissible for them to invoke

considerations that cannot be traced to an authoritative text." 167 This concept
of legislative supremacy is a dominant constitutional principle on both the
state and federal level.16s Furthermore, this favoring of the legislative branch
in both federal and state regimes is derived from a general philosophy of
accountability because this branch is subject to periodic elections. 69 However,
(describing rise of literalism in Supreme Court as response to Justice Scalia's arguments against
use of legislative history). Commentators have identified similar constitutional concerns behind
Justice Scalia's advocacy of a textualist or literalist approach to statutory interpretation. See id.
at 673-76 (discussing separation of powers); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: the
"New" New Legal Process, 12 CA.Dozo L. REv. 1597, 1619-20 (1991) (same). Despite the recent
association of plain meaning methodology with Justice Scalia, as one commentator has noted,
"the use of 'plain meaning' discourse is hardly limited to its most prominent proponent, but is
employed by every member of the Court .... " Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and
the CoordinatingFunction of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 231, 246.
164. See Merrill, supra note 159, at 13-19.
165. Id.
166. See Peter J. Galie, State Supreme Courts, Judicial Federalism and the Other Constitutions, 71 Jun. 100, 105 (1987) [hereinafter Galie, State Supreme Courts]; Peter J. Galie, The
Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRAcusE L. REv.
731, 788-90 (1982) [hereinafter Galie, The Other Supreme Courts].
167. Sunstein, supra note 159, at 415.
168. See Farber, supra note 159, at 283; Merrill, supra note 159, at 19-24.
169. See Merrill, supra note 159, at 24.
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while relevant to an evaluation of judicial activism in both the federal and
state courts, the concepts of separation of powers and electoral accountability
have different implications for the different systems.
On the simplest level, electoral accountability concerns are less compelling
in the case of state courts since "the overwhelming majority of states require
election of judges in some form or another. ' 170 This electoral accountability
should lessen the concerns, at least in some states, for the threat to democratic
governance posed by law-making by judges insulated from the popular will
through executive appointment and life tenure. However, this distinction does
not fully legitimate judicial law-making by state courts. The concept of
legislative supremacy is still applicable even to popularly elected judges.
Furthermore state constitutions, like the federal analogue, allocate the lawmaking function to the legislature. The critical difference between state and
federal courts lies in the context in which the two types of constitutions
function.
As we noted in the discussion of federalism, the federal government is
one of enumerated powers. The function of the federal Constitution is to
specify those enumerated powers within a context of general law-making
powers reserved to the states. The function of state constitutions, on the
other hand, is largely to circumscribe the otherwise plenary law-making
authority of the state government .'7 This plenary law-making power is vested
not only in law-making powers specified for the legislature but also in the
traditional common-law powers of the state courts. State courts make law
subject to the state legislature's power to modify by statute.172 This application
of the separation of powers concept differs dramatically from the federal
scheme where concepts of federalism and limited government require each
branch of government to derive its function from the explicit grant of power.
Therefore, the separation of powers concept embodied in the federal
Constitution may be seen to dictate a limited role for judicial law-making in
light of the explicit delegation of legislative power to the Congress and the
subordinated role of courts to legislative enactments when no constitutional
concerns are implicated. And, as we have seen, some view literalism as a
optimal device to constrain judicial activity within these constitutionally
prescribed limits. But in the case of state courts, the separation of powers
found in state constitutions does not serve to strip the courts of their
traditional common-law powers within a system of shared law-making authority. Therefore, whether acting in an area of legislative silence or legislative
ambiguity, it is not objectionable for state courts to make policy subject to
legislative veto.17 Thus, devices to constrain judicial law-making, such as a
plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation, are unnecessary, and in

170. Galle, State Supreme Courts, supra note 166, at 108. See also Galie, The Other Supreme
Courts, supra note 166, at 791.
171. See Galie, State Supreme Courts, supra note 166, at 104.
172. See Farber, supra note 159, at 283.
173. See id. at 286.
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fact contradictory to the state court's function within state government. 74
Beyond the constitutional motivations for the Supreme Court's literalist
approach, Professor Schauer has identified another institutional motivation
which, if true, leads us to argue that not only are state courts free to ignore
the Supreme Court's approach, but that they must. 17 In reviewing the Court's
use of plain meaning in its decisions during the 1989 Term, Professor Schauer
posits that plain meaning, although an imperfect device for determining the
meaning of any communication, is a "second-best coordinating device for
multiple decision makers attempting to reach some methodological consensus
in the face of substantive disagreements among them.' ' 76 Reviewing the cases
in which plain meaning was invoked, he concludes they share two characteristics. First, the cases are substantively uninteresting.' 7 Second, they involve
areas in which members of the Court have little "context-sensitive expertise." 78 Professor Schauer explains that plain meaning is a means to achieve
consensus decisions in cases which are, for the Court, both time consuming
in their complexity and yet uninteresting in their substance. 79 Securities cases
are complex and largely outside the expertise of the Court. They also may
be uninteresting to the Justices.
This latter point may be the key to understanding the seemingly anomalous use of literalism in the Landreth decision. By taking a literal approach
to "stock," and thereby rejecting the "sale of business" doctrine, the Court
opened the federal courts to claims which offer little justification for consuming the resources of the federal court system.'8 Previous uses of plain
meaning in securities cases could be seen as motivated by a larger agenda to
restrict access to federal courts by private litigants asserting federal securities
violations.'' In fact, the "sale of business" doctrine's purpose-based analysis
was also seen as motivated by this larger agenda.8 2 Therefore, it was surprising
to see the Court adopt a literalist approach to stock since it expanded, rather
than contracted, the scope of the federal remedy. But if the plain meaning
approach is invoked not as a means to a substantive outcome, but rather as

174. See Galie, State Supreme Courts, supra note 166, at 110 (stating that "[t]he case for
a more active judicial role is stronger at the state level"); Galie, The Other Supreme Courts,
supra note 166, at 792 (same).
175. See Schauer, supra note 163.
176. Id. at 232.
177. Id. at 253. That is, uninteresting to constitutional law scholars and, therefore, presumably Supreme Court Justices.
178. Id. See also Note, supra note 159, at 900-01 (identifying "heightened sense of judicial
incapacity" as motivation for plain meaning approach).
179. See Schauer, supra note 163, at 254.
180. See discussion supra Part II. B.
181. E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (finding that scienter requirement
for actions under Rule lOb-5 is derived from plain meaning of term "manipulative"). See also
Note, supra note 159, at 910-12 (identifying literalism as part of substantive agenda to limit
regulation and restrict access to federal courts).
182. See Karjala, supra note 46, at 419; Prentice & Roszkowski, supra note 19, at 506-09;
Thompson, supra note 44, at 225-27.
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an institutional solution for expediting the resolution of complex, yet deemed
unimportant cases, the anomaly evaporates.' What is left, however, is the
void created by the federal courts' abdication from a deliberative development
of securities regulation. If the federal courts look only for the easy ways to
dispose of securities cases, it will be left to the state courts to provide
thoughtful judicial development of the securities law statutes.
B.

The Case Against Harmony-A Critical Evaluation of the Benefits of
Federal/State Uniformity in the Definition of "Security"

Even if the Supreme Court employs a plain meaning approach because
of institutional concerns not applicable to state'courts, the policy of harmonization between state and federal securities regulation may nevertheless dictate
adherence to the federal precedents. As previously discussed, state courts have
followed the Supreme Court's literalist approach in the name of federal-state
harmony, despite substantive disagreement with the rationale. 1 4 But while
this policy of harmonization is found on the face of the state statutes, 85 a
more discerning reading is required.
First, although the statutory provision appears to set forth an unambiguous coordination requirement, the draftsmen's comments make clear that
adherence to federal precedents is not mandatory. The statutory provision
states, "This act shall be construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the
interpretation and administration of this act with the related federal regulation.' 8 6 The commentary, however, states in part, "[The provision] recognizes
that a secondary aim of this Act is to coordinate securities regulation at the
federal and state levels in so far as practicable .... [It] does not mean that
a state court or Administrator is requiredto follow a judicial or administrative
precedent set by another state or by the SEC." 1 7
Second, the statute's use of the phrase "to coordinate" when it speaks
of federal law rather than "to make uniform" which it uses 'when speaking
of other state laws is noteworthy. In an earlier provision regarding the
adoption of rules and forms, the statute states, "In prescribing rules and
forms the [Administrator] may cooperate with the securities administrators
of the other states and the Securities and Exchange Commission with a view
to effectuating the policy of this statute to achieve maximum uniformity in
the form and content of registration statements, applications, and reports

183. This is precisely one of the rationales offered in the Landreth opinion. See supra note
62 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 4 & 12 and accompanying text.
185. See UNroam SEcUrrEs ACT (1956) § 415, 7B U.L.A. 678 (1985) (last amended in
1958); UrNroais SEcURrrms AcT (1985) § 803, 7B U.L.A. 132 (1993 Supp.) (last amended in

1988).
186. U~iroiw SEcUrrIEs AcT (1956) § 415, 7B U.L.A. 678 (1985) (last amended in 1958);
§ 803, 7B U.L.A. 132 (1993 Supp.) (last amended in 1988).
187. Louis Loss, CoMMENTARY ON Ta UNIFORM SEcuar
ACT 165 (1976) (emphasis in
the original).
UONsoRM: SEcutaRms AcT (1985)
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wherever practicable." ' 188 The one instance in which the state statutes specifically anticipate coordination is in the registration process. 189 To avoid the
unnecessary cost of multiple registration filings, the statute allows issuers who
have filed with the federal authorities to register with the state administrator
by simply providing copies of the federal filings. Duplicative filing requirements are clearly wasteful. It is therefore not surprising that the state statute
emphasizes uniformity in "registration statements, applications, and reports."
But does a policy of coordination extend beyond efforts to reduce the
paperwork requirements of a system of dual regulation? Is the same clear
benefit obtained by making application of the statute uniform between the
federal and state, or even among various state, regimes? The logic of avoiding
wasteful duplication through coordination does not ineluctably extend to the
question of diversity in the scope of each state's statute. To see this point,
consider a recent state court decision.
In New Mexico Life Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Quinn & Co.,190 the
issue that the court addressed was whether certain annuity contracts would
be exempt from registration under the state securities act. In deciding that
they were exempt, the court adopted as applicable under the state act a
Securities and Exchange Commission rule that provided a safe harbor exemption for annuity contracts under federal law. In explaining its decision to
incorporate the federal administrative rule into its state regime, the court
stated:
To better serve the smooth flow of interstate commerce in these
products, and to foster a healthy business climate in this state, we
now adopt federal precedent in construing the New Mexico definition
of "security" in cases implicating annuity products. Otherwise potential New Mexico offerors of the products would face the uncertainty of what may be different legal requirements in this state.' 9'
This notion that "a healthy business climate" requires uniformity among
states and between states and the federal government in defining the proper
subject matter of regulation underlies the extension of the coordination logic
to the definition of security. This logic is compelling only if one opposes
regulation generally, and not simply the waste of duplicative filing requirements.
Diversity in the definition of "security," and thereby in the scope of
securities regulations, can generate two possibilities-states with lesser regulation or states with greater, in each case the benchmark being the level of

188. UNIFORM SECuRrriEs ACT (1956) § 412(b), 7B U.L.A. 669 (1985) (last amended in
1958). See also UNIFORM Sacurris ACT (1985) § 705(b), 7B U.L.A. 125 (1993 Supp.) (last
amended in 1988).
189. See UNIFORM SEcuRIES ACT (1956) § 303, 7B U.L.A. 559 (1985) (last amended in
1958); UznroRM SECUtrES ACT (1985), 7B U.L.A. 93 (1993 Supp.) (last amended in 1988).
190. 809 P.2d 1278 (N.M. 1991).
191. New Mexico Life Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Quinn & Co., 809 P.2d 1278, 1283 n.5 (N.M.
1991).
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federal regulation. In the former case, lesser regulation, the diversity will
have no impact on interstate commerce since federal regulation will impose
the minimum standard. It is only in the later case, greater regulation, that
diversity will matter. New Mexico might, for example, extend its registration
and antifraud requirements to the sale of annuity contracts when no other
authority, federal or state, does. But why is this difference necessarily
antithetical to a "healthy business climate?" To reach that conclusion, one
must have also concluded that the regulation under the securities act of the
sale of annuity contracts is unhealthy.
The authors make no pretense to resolving, or even contributing to the
debate that one set of commentators described as the "intellectual stalemate
between those who favor strong state regulation of business and those who
advocate deregulation."' 92 Our point is that if one is equivocal as to the
wisdom of a broad regulation of the sale of investment devices, there is no
coherent objection to diversity in the definition of "security." Since regulation
may, in fact, be healthy, such as by providing market confidence, New
Mexico should feel free to experiment with regulating the sale of annuity
contracts. By differing from other states, New Mexico may in fact offer an
even more hospitable business climate for offerors of annuity contracts. 93 By
differing from the federal choice, it will surely contribute to a multiplicity of
experiences that will serve the incremental development of securities regulation. l 9

This last point deserves some elaboration. Not only is diversity in the
scope of state securities acts permissible since there are no unequivocal benefits
to uniformity, but diversity offers an affirmative value of its own as well.
Unlike the almost unquestioned ethic of uniformity in state and federal
securities regulation, numerous writers have articulated the benefits of diversity
within a system of dual regulation when discussing constitutional issues and
individual rights. 195 Consider, for example, the following statement by Shirley
Abrahamson, a member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
192.

IAN AREas & Jom BRAn-HwAnm, REsPoNsivE REGULATION: TRANSCENDiNG THE DE-

REGuLATION DEATE 3 (1992).
193. And thereby might encourage a beneficial competitiveness among state regulators. Cf.
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation:The DesirableLimits on State Competition
in Corporate Law, 105 HA~v. L. Roy. 1435 (1992) (examining limitations on state competition
for development of corporate law rules).
194. An example of the benefits of multiple experiences might be seen in Cellular Eng'g,

Ltd. v. O'Neill, 820 P.2d 941 (Wash. 1991). In that case the court looked to both similar federal
experience and analogous sister state experience to determine whether FCC cellular phone license
lottery pools should be subject to the state securities act. Id. at 950-51.
195. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951,
972-74 (1982) (5th Annual Roy R. Ray Lecture) (providing extensive bibliography of literature);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the FederalJudiciary, 36 UCLA
L. REv. 233, 302-10 (1988) (arguing that litigants should have available both federal and state
forums for vindicating personal liberties); Galie, The Other Supreme Courts, supra note 166, at
791 (arguing that state courts can serve as laboratories in federal system). But see Earl M. Maltz,
The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEx. L. REv. 995 (1985) (arguing against state court

activism).
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How am I as a state judge to decide what the state constitution
means? I use the same techniques as I use to decide what any law
means. I try to find the intent of the framers ....

I examine the

earlier decisions of our court, the decisions of sister courts, and the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the same
or similar provisions. The reasoning of other courts may be persuasive. I look at the peculiarities of my state-its land, its industry, its
people, its history. Alas, it would be easier for me just to read the
writings of the United States Supreme Court ...

and follow the

teachings. Why take the hard road when you can take the easy path?
I advocate the process of analyzing the state constitution because
I think such analysis has positive advantages. One advantage of such
analysis is diversity ....
New federalism serves as a reminder to state courts that they
should experiment with new approaches that, if successful, may later
be applied nationwide by the United States Supreme Court. State
experimentation serves to guide the Supreme Court in its determinations.'9
The same words could be spoken in favor of experimentation with the scope
of securities regulation.'19 Simply replace in the foregoing passage the phrase
"state constitution" with "state securities act."
V. TutRNIo "INVESTMENT CONTRACT" INSIDE OuT: GENrEIRAL
PAIRTNERSmlPS AND OTma RATTuNGS INSIDE THE Howey Cage
A.

Labels as Literalism

Neither the Securities Act of 1933 nor the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 contains the word "partnership" in the statutory laundry list of items
denominated a security. 19 A consequence of that omission is that, in order
to hold that a partnership interest is a security, that interest must come within

196. Abrahamson, supra note 195, at 965-66. See also Galie, The Other Supreme Courts,
supra note 166, at 791 (noting that state courts are freer to experiment since their decisions have
only local impact).
Or, to quote Justice Brandeis, "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal- system that
a single courageous [s]tate [court] may ... serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
197. As a matter of fact, these words have been spoken. See Louis Loss & EDWARD M.
Cowr, BLuE SKY LAW 237 (1958) (stating that "if individual states want to go further than
disclosure [i.e., the emphasis of federal securities regulation], it is part of the genius of our
federal scheme that they should be permitted to do so") (footnote omitted).
198. See Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(I0) (1988).
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the catchall "investment contract," as developed in SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co.199 and subsequent cases.
The federal courts' application of investment contract analysis to general
partnerships provides another example of the literalist approach that has
swept federal courts in the 1980s and 1990s. However, this time courts are
not reading the text of a statute literally, but instead, they are reading the
label of a document literally.
Eschewing mandates that prevailed from the 1930s to the 1970s that
courts should construe securities legislation with its remedial purposes in
mind,20 and that courts should look beyond labels to the economic realities
of transactions, 201 federal courts have begun to search no further than the
label on the face of a document. If that label is general partnership, and the
paperwork bears that out, courts have looked no further. When defendants
moved to dismiss, appending copies of partnership agreements to their motions, federal courts ignored whatever economic realities might be present.
Almost as a matter of docket control, courts seized the opportunity presented
to eliminate entire portions of their caseload. Literalism, as applied to
securities cases involving general partnerships, became neither a means of
doing justice nor an instrument of federalism or other constitutional concerns.
It became simply a plebeian tool to reduce the courts' workload.
B. The PolarStar-Williamson v. Tucker and Other "Early" Cases
Earlier cases dealt with partnership interests as securities.2 The modem
era" begins, however, with the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Williamson v.
Tucker.203 In Williamson plaintiffs purchased undivided interests in a 160 acre
parcel near the site of the future Dallas-Fort Worth Airport. They reconveyed
those interests to joint ventures structured as general partnerships by a local
investment company. When the "sure thing" did not unfold as planned,
plaintiffs defaulted on the promissory notes they had executed. Their sellers,
original owners of the parcel, foreclosed. In turn, the four plaintiff general
partners sued both the investment company who promoted the joint venture
and their sellers under the securities acts. The first half of the lawsuit depended
upon whether the general partnership interests were investment contracts.20
199. 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (holding that "an investment contract for purposes of the
Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of a promoter or a third
party").
200. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
201. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (stating that '.[]n
searching for the meaning and scope of the word "security" ... form should be disregarded
for substance and the emphasis should be on the economic reality') (quoting Tcherepnin).
202. See, e.g., Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y.) (1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750
(2d Cir. 1977) (holding that partnership interest in brokerage firm is not security); New York
Stock Exch., Inc. v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (similar).
203. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
204. The second half of the lawsuit depended upon whether the promissory notes they had
delivered to the sellers were securities. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 426-29 (5th Cir.
1981).
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The district court had ruled they were not, dismissing the'suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 20
"On the face of a partnership agreement," the court found, "the investor
retains substantial control over his investment and an ability to protect
himself.. .

."2

The court followed with the most oft-quoted language in the

partnership field:
Such an investor must demonstrate that, in spite of the partnership
form which the investment took, he was so dependent on the promoter
or on a third party that he was in fact unable to exercise meaningful
partnership powers. A general partnership or joint venture can be
designated a security if the investor can establish, for example, that
(1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands
of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes
power as would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer
is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he
is incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture
powers; or (3)the partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique
entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that
he cannot replace the manager ...

or otherwise exercise meaningful

partnership or venture powers.?
The enumerated items have become known as the "three prongs" of Williamson v. Tucker. In shorthand, they are (1) text of the partnership agreement; (2) character or nature of the investor; and (3) character or nature of
the manager or promoter.
In Williamson, the court remanded for application of its three pronged
test but plaintiffs' future was not bright: (1) the partnership agreement did
nothing to negate the traditional powers of control that general partners have;
(2) the plaintiffs were all past and present executives of the Frito-Lay Company
and were thus experienced in business affairs; and (3) the investment company
was to act as a real estate developer, hardly a role requiring unique or
irreplaceable expertise.
C. Down the Channel Toward Literalism-Truncationof the Three Prong
Test to the FirstProng
Williamson is a solid nautical chart for an economic realities inquiry
when a lawsuit presents a general partnership interest issue. Although the
Williamson test includes three prongs, other federal courts quickly began
focusing exclusively on the first prong. A notable example was Goodwin v.
Elkins & Co.m Goodwin was a longstanding general partner of a regional
brokerage firm. He was persuaded to advance his retirement date by a few

205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 409-10.
Id at 424.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
730 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1984).
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months. He sold his partnership interest back to the partnership. He later
found out that his partners had rushed him in order to sell the entire firm
to Bache, Halsey, Stewart a few months later for a handsome profit that
now had to be sliced into one fewer share. Goodwin's case was precisely of
the sort that many seminal securities law decisions have involved.2
Goodwin protested that he had little power or responsibility: "his actual
position was no more than that of a limited partner.. . effective control of
the firm rested exclusively with the Managing Partner and the Management
Committee of the firm.1 210 Although Goodwin's characterization of the actual
situation may well have been accurate, the Third Circuit swept it aside. Judge
Garth applied only the first prong of Williamson v. Tucker. Under the
Pennsylvania partnership statute and the Elkins & Co. agreement, in theory
Goodwin had the power to exert control over partnership affairs or to obtain
information. As the court put it, "[w]hether a partnership interest constitutes
a security depends upon the legal rights and powers enjoyed by the partners." 211 Never mind that collective action problems might prevent Goodwin
or the other partners from coming together to wrest control from the
managing partner or that Goodwin's lame duck status may have prevented
any searching inquiry by him into partnership affairs. Instead Judge Garth
and Chief Judge Seitz (in a concurring opinion) converted a sideshow into
the main event. They debated merely whether they should look at the
agreement alone or at both the agreement and the partnership statute to
determine what the general partner's "legal rights" were.
The nautical metaphor becomes appropriate again with Rivana Trawlers
Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers.12 Retired Supreme Court Justice Powell,
sitting by designation, purported to apply Williamson v. Tucker. In reality,
he either narrowly applied the case or applied a slightly expanded version of
the Goodwin v. Elkins & Co. "first prong only" analysis. As to the former,
he characterized Williamson v. Tucker as a "narrow exception to the strong
presumption that a general partnership is not a security" 213 and noted that
"only under certain limited circumstances can an investor's general partnership"
interest be characterized as a security.1 21 4 As to the latter, he recited salient
209. Indeed, the very first action giving money damages for a Rule lOb-5 violation was such
a case. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
210. Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1984).
211. Id. at 107 (emphasis in original).
212. 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988).
213. Rivana Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, 840 F.2d 236, 240 (4th Cir. 1988).
214. Id. at 241. He continued, stating that "the presumption that the general partnership is
not a security can only be rebutted by evidence that it is not possible for the partners to exercise
those powers [given them by their agreement and the partnership statute]." Id. In a footnote,
he added
If and to the extent Williamson and other cases may be read to require a court to
look to the actual knowledge and business expertise of each partner in order to assess
his or her ability intelligently to exercise the power of a general partner, we do not
agree. Such an inquiry would undercut the strong presumption that an interest in a
general partnership is not a security.
Id. at 241 n.7.
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features of the partnership agreement, finding "the ability to control the
profitability of the enterprise. ' ' 215 The legal rights of plaintiffs were the only
factual matters upon which he dwelled.
Plaintiff investors in Rivana were twenty-four passive investors who
purchased interests in partnerships formed to acquire and operate four fishing
vessels. They badly undercut their argument for application of Williamson's
second or third prongs by having twice removed Rivana Trawlers' external
managers and also by having replaced the original managing partner. But
again, though, Mr. Justice Powell's sole emphasis was upon the terms of the
partnership and Williamson v. Tucker's first prong.
D. A Near Free Fall into the Abyss of Literalism-The Ninth Circuit and
GeneralPartnership Interests as Investment Contracts
For an extreme position in the general partnership as investment contract
area, one need only look to the Ninth Circuit. In Matek v. Murat,2 6 twelve
San Pedro, California investors put $100,000 each into a partnership formed
to convert a surplus navy vessel into a fish processor. When the deal soured,
they sued the promoter and his law firm. The defense claimed that general
partnership interests are not securities.
Judge Wiggins writing for the majority purportedly rejected the "bright
line" legal rights only approach of Goodwin, opting instead for Williamson
and its economic realities inquiry. 21 7 However, he then rejected the second
and third prongs of Williamson v. Tucker218 reasoning that:
The two other "prongs" ...
create uncertainty in the area of
business investing. They require that a promoter investigate the
business experience and acumen of all potential investors and then
tailor his offerings to them. To some he might offer a general
partnership interest, to others a security.... The focus must be on
the expectations the parties had in the original transaction....
The Williamson test would also require the courts to find an
investment a security in relation to some investors and a partnership
in relation to others .... Categorizing the plaintiffs in that fashion
21 9
is untenable.
Judge Wiggins never reveals why requiring a promoter to investigate the
business experience and acumen of potential participants in an offering is a
bad thing. As a matter of preventive law, such action is recommended practice
for those conducting small and exempt offerings such as the one involved in
Matek. Screening and even pre-screening of potential offerees by use of

215. Id. at 242.
216. 862 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1988).
217. See Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1988).
218. Id. at 730 (noting that "[w]e decline, however, to adopt the other two 'prongs' of the
Williamson test") (footnote omitted).

219. Id. at 729.
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questionnaires and similar devices is a practice many in the industry follow.
Applying the first prong of Williamson, Judge Wiggins noted that "[tihe
terms of the agreement provide them with all the access and ability to protect
their investment that the securities laws would otherwise provide." This was
a "standard general partnership" and therefore not a security. 220 Judge
Wiggins did put a gloss on the first prong of Williamson. He "found no
evidence that the general partnership agreement was purposefully drafted to
escape the application of the securities laws," intimating that if the partnership
form were abused in that way he would find an investment contract.
Following Matek several Circuit Court opinions rejected meritorious
claims because the promoters had structured their deals as "general partnerships" or because the transaction involved a general partnership interest. 22!
Labels and literalism prevailed. Ninth Circuit district judges only had to look
at the appellation the promoter and his lawyer had appended to the item. A
quick confirming glance at the partnership agreement ended the case, at least
as a federal securities matter.
E.

Nautical Chart for Evasion-The Economic Realities of Investments
Structured as Partnerships

Beginning with Williamson and Goodwin and accelerated by cases such
as Matek, a trend emerged. Every promoter who knew what she was doing,
or who had a decently schooled transactional lawyer, structured their deal as
a general partnership. Breeding bull deals, vineyard partnerships, real estate
syndications, Christmas tree and ornamental shrub growing ventures, wheat
farm transactions, and all other manner of deals, unlike the traditional
partnership because they involved the coming together of perfect strangers,
hit the streets as general partnerships. Because the general partners remained
liable for the partnership debts, the risks were very high. The tales of woe
told by quite ordinary middle class investors proliferated. They were the
victims of literalism, although telling them would be of little solace. What
also became apparent is that the federal judges applying this literal approach
did not have the slightest clue of what the economic realities were.
A typical transaction would work in a similar manner as the following
example. m After several good years in his apple orchard, Farmer Greenjeans
could foresee a market glut caused by high prices and resulting increased
production. Longer term his choices might be bankruptcy on the downside,

220. Id. at 731.
221. See, e.g., Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. Partnership, 902 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1990)
(holding that movie production partnership involving passive investors is not security) (citing
Matek); Reeves v. Teuscher, 881 F.2d 1495, 1499-1500 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that general
partnerships interests in limited partnerships formed to sell and develop desert real estate are not
investment contracts).
222. The hypothetical in text is based loosely on the facts of EMA Securities Litigation,
No. C-86-241-RJM (E.D. Wa.) amended complaintfiled sub nom. Anderson v. Thompson (D.
Mont., Sept. 18, 1985). One of the authors served as an expert witness and consultant in the
case.
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or syndication on the upside. Along come promoters Bert and Ernie, trained
as accountants or engineers or real estate developers. Bert and Ernie offer a
very high price with very little down to Farmer Greenjeans for his Chief
Joseph orchard, but Farmer Greenjeans will have to wait up to six months
for closing. Farmer Greenjeans takes the high road-syndication is for him.
Bert and Ernie return to the city. They roll up their sleeves. First they
subdivide the orchard. They break up the sixty acre orchard they are to
acquire for $900,000 into ten six acre plots, each plot to be owned by a
separate general partnership (Chief Joseph Partnership Number One, Chief
Joseph Number Two, Chief Joseph Three . . .).n Bert and Ernie file a plat
of subdivision with the local authorities.
Next they draft an offering circular. With attachments (partnership agreement, master partnership agreement among partnerships, horticultural agreement, marketing agreement, and more) the offering document will rival the
Minneapolis telephone directory in size. The offering will seek to raise not
$900,000, not $1.1 million but, over time, $1.5 million. Each partnership will
raise one tenth of that, or $150,000. Investors do not even have to come up
with their share of that sum. To be one of five partners in the partnership,
each investor puts forward $15,000 cash and a $15,000 promissory note,
backed by a letter of credit from a commercial bank.
Upon analysis, the deal looks very conservative. Bert and Ernie will raise
$750,000 cash, they only owe Farmer Greenjeans $900,000, and they will
have apples to sell in several months' time. The deal is not quite conservative
as would appear, though. Bert and Ernie receive $250,000 off the top as a
"syndication fee." They take $100,000 or so as a first year "management
fee." They reimburse themselves $80,000 for the costs of the offering (accountants, lawyers, printing). The management account gets $70,000 for
chemicals, tractor fuel, improvements to the irrigation system, and the like.
An additional $70,000 is kept in reserve to make the monthly payments to
Farmer Greenjeans. Those payments have to be made until such time as sale
of the apple crop kicks in, after which (off the record, of course) the investors
are told they probably will never have to pay another cent.
The promissory notes are a precaution only. Easy street is just around
the corner. Projections in the offering circular confirm this. Those projections
show that under Bert and Ernie's expert management and horticultural
methods production will increase every year. Not only that, apple prices will
also increase every year. In year two, proceeds from the apple crop will cover
all, or nearly all, payments to Farmer Greenjeans. By year three of the
partnership, there will be a positive cash flow, much of which will be
223. Cf. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1946):
The land sales contract ...

provides for a uniform purchase price per acre ....

Purchases are usually made in narrow strips of land arranged so that an acre consists
of a row of 48 trees ....

These tracts are not separately fenced ....

The purchasers for the most part are non-residents of Florida. They are predominantly business and professional people who lack the knowledge, skill and equipment
necessary for the care and cultivation of citrus trees.
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distributed to the partners. By year four and year five, that flow will become
a torrent. Horray for Bert and Ernie. They sure are smart and know how
to structure a deal. And with their management skills, they certainly deserve
that syndication fee. Everyone will be rich.
But, in reality, Bert and Ernie do not know how to manage apple
orchards (or Christmas tree farms, or breeding operations, or whatever).
They are real estate developers who live in nice yuppie suburbs. Even if they
did know their pomology, Bert and Ernie are too busy. They are seeking out
other orchards to syndicate. They want to operate this money machine they
have invented two or three times a year.? After five years, with ten to twelve
orchards syndicated, Bert and Ernie will be splitting $1 million to $1.2 million
in annual management fees.
So Bert and Ernie must hire a manager to oversee their orchards. Of
course, Bert and Ernie are strangers to the district. The chances are that the
manager they are able to hire (a) is inexperienced, (b) has a substance abuse
problem, or (c) is lazy. Besides, their manager must oversee five, six or seven
orchards. So the manager subcontracts with Mr. Greenjeans actually to
manage Chief Joseph. Mr. Greenjeans, however, wants to swing in his
hammock, drinking ice tea, so he hires young kids or itinerant workers who
do the hands on spraying, pruning and other tasks an apple orchard requires.
The net result is that Bert and Ernie have taken a cyclical business,
marginal even in fairly good years with one set of managers, and overlaid a
four-tiered management structure with each tier taking its own bite out of
any proceeds of the crop. Then, too, apple prices fall instead of rising. With
these marginal managers in place, production falls, too. There is a doublebarreled effect with falling prices and falling output. The projections in the
offering circular are working-but in reverse.
In year two the investors must pay on their notes. Their cash outlay has
doubled. In year three, year four and year five the investors have to dig into
their pocketbooks to carry the mortgage to Farmer Greenjeans, the management fee to Bert and Ernie, and possibly other expenses as well.
The investors meet and they grumble, but they have no choice. They are
general partners and liable on a plenary basis. Besides, Bert and Ernie's
lawyer telephones them, haranguing much in the manner of Kilgore Trout.22
The investors look at the partnership agreements. Sixty percent of the partners
in each partnership and sixty percent of the partnerships must take action to
remove Bert and Ernie as managers. It would take a lot of groundwork to
get everyone pulling together like that, especially since the investors are spread
among several cities and states.

224. And it is a money machine. If Bert and Ernie do it right, they need only a few
thousand in cash. They need a thousand or two as earnest money to accompany the offer of
purchase to Mr. Greenjeans and a similar amount as a retainer to a lawyer. Otherwise, through
stretching out the closing date with Mr. Greenjeans or by using a double escrow they are never
out significant amounts of funds. Who says you can't make something from nothing?
225. See generally KuRT VOmNoUT, JR., GOD BLEss You MR. ROSEwATER (1967).
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The investors, for the most part of modest means and background,
include a railroad engineer, a high schoo0l teacher, a truck driver, an FBI
agent, a power company engineer, and so on. They all live several hundred
miles from the orchard. They are mystified by what has happened. Because
the investment is structured as a general partnership, each is on the hook
now for $75,000 or $85,000 per unit. Some even purchased two units. Their
finances are strained to the breaking point. About $1,500 of every monthly
paycheck goes to carry the orchard investment. Finally, they say "no moreno more good money after bad." They organize, they finally have partnership
meetings,22 and they hire a lawyer.
The lawyer sues Bert and Ernie, the accountants who did the "compilation," the bank who kept the enterprise afloat by providing funds based
on assignment of proceeds of partnership assessments, the lawyer who copied
each offering circular from the previous one, changing only some of the
names and numbers, and the securities salesman who sold the deal to
plaintiffs. "27 The action is either a class action or a direct action with several
dozen named plaintiffs. Either way it is a sizeable lawsuit.
Arriving in federal court, the parties skirmish for a time. The plaintiffs
then encounter a defense motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction 8 or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. "29
The grounds are that general partnership interests are not securities. The
judge reads the defense brief, leafs through the partnership agreement to see
if anything unusual is contained therein, perhaps in passing notes the uncanny
resemblance to the facts of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., and dismisses the
lawsuit, seeing a neat and clean way to clear the docket. Plaintiffs refile in
state court on common law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty grounds
where, if the state statute of limitations has not run, they may obtain relief
eventually.
These general partnership cases were paradigm investment contract cases.
They were beyond paradigm because the general partnership feature and
accompanying unlimited liability made the risk threefold or more that involved
in a limited partnership or incorporated venture, which would always be
3
found to involve a security. 0
That then was the tale of woe born of literalism in the general partnership
field. Time and time again scenarios similar to the one justidescribed played
themselves out in the trial courts. And who were the winners? Federal judges,
who cleared their docket a bit. And Farmer Greenjeans who, after becoming

226. Many promoters organize and script partnership meetings along the way, usually upon
advice of counsel. If sued under the securities laws, the promoter can say not only did the
partners have legal rights, they exercised some of them.
227. See Douglas M. Branson, CollateralParticipantLiability Under the Securities LawsCharting the Proper Course, 65 ORE. L. R v. 327 (1986). Cf. Branson, supra note 157.
228. FED. RULE Crv. PRO. 12(b)(i).
229. FED. RULE Crv. PRO. 12(b)(6).

230. A similar observation can be made about the "sale of business" doctrine. See the
discussion of Barnes v. Sunderman, supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
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$400,000 or $500,000 richer, foreclosed on the property, moved back into
the farm house (if he ever left), and will live to syndicate again, probably as
a general partnership.
F. A Return from the Abyss to the Land of Economic Reality
The Ninth Circuit eventually recognized the incongruity of what they had
done and pulled back from the literalism they had earlier espoused. The
pullback began with a condominium in Hawaii. Plaintiff Hocking visited
Honolulu from his home in Las Vegas. Real estate agent DuBois sparked his
interest in a $115,000 condominium by telling him that the unit would reap
$100 per day in rentals and that a rental management agreement and rental
pool agreement with management company HCP would join Hocking with
many other owners in a complex that would be managed as a first rate resort
hotel. Little of this came to pass. Hocking defaulted on his note, lost the
condominium and his $24,000 down payment. Hocking sued, styling his
complaint Hocking v. DuBois.2 '
To determine whether the package of condominium and rental pool
agreement constituted an investment contract, that is, whether they raised the
expectation of profits from the efforts of others, Judge Goodwin, on behalf
of an en banc court, applied the teachings of a general partnership case,
namely, Williamson v. Tucker. As to the first prong of Williamson, he found
that Hocking had the legal power to manage the asset. The rental pool
period and the
arrangement was terminable during an annual ninety day
232
management agreement terminable on thirty days notice.
Hocking, however, successfully argued application of both second and
third prongs. He claimed to be "an unsophisticated, inexperienced investor
[who] resides thousands of miles away." He thus might not have had the
ability to exercise whatever legal rights he had under his agreements. As to
the third prong, the court found that the manager might indeed be irreplaceable. That the complex was managed as a hotel and that a seventy percent
vote of unit owners was required to change managers created "a real question
whether Hocking was stuck with HCP as a rental manager." Management
who could and would operate the place as a hotel "may be a much more
difficult service to replace than that of a long term leasing agent." 233 The
court remanded for factual inquiries on the second and third prongs of
Williamson.
Hocking v. DuBois involved a condominium, not a partnership. In the
very next partnership case, however, the Ninth Circuit held that "reliance on
Matek [was] misplaced ... in light of the subsequent en banc opinion in
Hocking v. DuBois." 2-4 Investors in a 2700 acre jojoba bean plantation

231. 885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
232. Hocking v. DuBois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1989).
233. Id. at 1461.
234. Koch v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471, 1477 (9th Cir. 1991). In so doing, the court struck
a blow against literalism. See id. at 1478. The court stated:
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numbered 160 and purchased interests in 35 partnerships numbered I through
XXXV. They persuaded the Ninth Circuit panel that they came within the
second and third prongs of Williamson. Since jojoba farm managers were
not readily available, and replacement of management required an investor
"to catalyze a vote in each of the thirty five partnerships," in addition to
her own, "even if a general partner vigorously exercised ... her rights under
the partnership agreement, . . . she arguably could have no impact on the
investment ..... ,,11 The partnership inquiry was re-focused on economic
realities. The upsurge of literalism in the Ninth Circuit had been quashed.
In a subsequent opinion, another panel confirmed that the en banc
'2 6
It
opinion in Hocking "replaces Matek as controlling in the Circuit.
remains to be seen if other Circuits will follow, or if the Supreme Court will
let them.
G. Literalism in the State Courts-ReluctanceAgain to Follow the Feds
From time to time, a state court slipped into the literalist mode. For
example, in Bahre v. Pearl,2 7 the Supreme Court of Maine noted that "federal
case law provides some guidance to state courts . . . but is not controlling
....
The court then went on to do the opposite. By rote, the court
applied the literalist approach of federal courts to find interests in a general
partnership formed to redevelop property on the Portland waterfront not to
9
be investment contracts, citing Banghart v. Hollywood General Partnership
and Rivana Trawlers.
More analytical and more in keeping with state courts' role as courts of
general jurisdiction is a Missouri Appellate Court opinion, State v. Kramer,M
finding a general partnership interest to have been a security. The court first
eschewed a literalist approach:
''23

[I]n determining the applicability of the Securities Act, we look
beyond labels and language and form to the economic realities
involved in the transaction....
The courts in Missouri have long recognized the need to look to
substance rather than form and to examine all the circumstances

[The promoters also seek to distinguish Hocking on the basis that it did not address
a general partnership but involved a condominium and rental pooling agreement. This
second point is a distinction without a difference, running directly counter to Howey's
mandate that courts address "economic reality" rather than focusing on the labels
attached to schemes by promoters.
Id.
235. Id. at 1480-81.
236. Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding horse breeding
partnership not to be security because investors were experienced and sophisticated and because
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that there was no "reasonable replacement" for manager).
237. 595 A.2d 1027, 1031 (Me. 1991).
238. Bahre v. Pearl, 595 A.2d 1027, 1031 n.5 (Me. 1991).
239. 902 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1990).
240. 804 S.W.2d 845 (Mo. App. 1991).
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surrounding the transaction in order to effectuate the purpose of
securities laws.?'
The policy reason for rejecting the literal approach was that
This flexible approach, looking to substance rather than form, to
economic reality rather than terminology, is predicated upon a recognition of the fact that the ingenuity of those who resort to "get
rich quick schemes" to fleece the gullible public is boundless. No
hard and fast rule or rigid definition of "security" or "investment
contract" which is impervious to evasion can be devised. 242
A similar opinion from the heartland is a Kansas Appellate Court decision,
State v. Ribadeneira,243 involving sale of a general partnership interest in a
real estate limited partnership:

[Tihe sale of a general partnership interest is generally not considered the sale of a security....
However, our Supreme Court has made it very clear that the fact
of labeling something as a general partnership does not make it so.
As Justice Prager said... "This test is to be applied in light of the
economic realities of the particular contractual arrangement. . ." An
interest labeled a general partnership can, in fact, be a security despite
its denomination.3
The court cited none of the newer federal partnership cases. Instead, it relied
on Howey and SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprisesin upholding the trial
court finding of security.
Similar to the Missouri approach in Kramer or the Kansas approach in
Ribadeneira is an Arkansas general partnership case, Casali v. Shultz.24
Defendant Shultz was a senior vice president of an Arkansas based financial
services company who, wanted his own firm. Using a general partnership, he
raised $1.2 million from eight Little Rock physicians, an art dealer, and the
plaintiff to purchase an obscure New York investment banking firm. The
Arkansas Supreme Court found a security under all three prongs of Williamson v. Tucker, adding thereto its own analysis:
[R]egardless of the label on a document, the underlying economic
substance of a security is an arrangement where the investor is a
mere passive contributor of risk capital to a venture in which he has
no direct or managerial control.
The mere fact that an investment takes the form of a general
partnership does not insulate it from the reach of the Arkansas
Securities Act. 246

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

State v. Kramer, 804 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Mo. App. 1991).
Id. at 848.
817 P.2d 1105 (Kan. App. 1991).
State v. Ribadeneira, 817 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Kan. App. 1991).
732 S.W.2d 836 (Ark. 1987).
Casali v. Shultz, 732 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Ark. 1987) (citation omitted).
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Other cases form part of this mosaic of mutiny in the state courts in the
general partnership area. Pointedly, other state appellate courts have ignored
the literalist federal court decisions of the modem era.247 In truth, the picture
is not uniform.24 Of eight recent state appellate decisions we found in the
partnership investment contract area, five found a security to be present or
leaned strongly in that direction. 29 In several of those cases, state appellate
court judges obviously felt that they, as well as state securities law, had a
different role to play than the federal courts, one of gap filling and investor
protection.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article began by identifying the United States Supreme Court's most
recent utterances on the definition of security as rejections of a previous,
longstanding economic realities approach. In Landreth and Gould and, to a
lesser extent, in Reves, the Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts
to approach the securities statutes literally and to shun a purpose-based
inquiry to determine whether the case at hand merits application of the federal
securities laws' protections. The authors bemoan this development for several
reasons.
First, we join the chorus which has found the Supreme Court's recent
descent into a textualist or literalist interpretational methodology as dishonest. 2 0 Interpretation inescapably calls for extra-textual considerations, and
literalism often leads to absurd results. As observers of the rapidly evolving
securities industry to which the statutes written some six decades ago must
be applied, we think it more meaningful to assume that "[s]tatutes ...
should-like the Constitution and the common law-be interpreted 'dynam'
ically,' that is, inlight of their present societal, political, and legal context."2'

247. See, e.g., Probst v. State, 807 P.2d 279 (Crim. App. Okla. 1991), in which the court
noted that the investors were unsophisticated persons lured into the scheme by a defendant to
whom they had come for estate planning. The court added lack of sophistication as a distinct
element of a Williamson v. Tucker approach, noting that:
This analysis squares with the purpose of the State Securities Act which is to protect
people from schemes, such as the one considered here, which defraud the public....
[Allowing the facial terms of the investment to dictate whether the statute applies]
would insulate clever schemers from criminal responsibility and fail to provide protection to victims.
Id. at 288 (Lane, J., concurring). See also Garrett v. Snedigar, 359 S.E.2d 283 (S.C. App. 1987)
(reversing summary judgment in plaintiff's favor as premature but quoting liberally from Howey
and Tcherepnin v. Knight).
248. See, e.g., Brannon v. Rinzler, 603 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio App. 1991) (holding that tax
shelter general partnership is not security); Shinn v. Thrust IV, Inc., 786 P.2d 285 (Wash. App.
1990) (holding that odd individually negotiated limited partnership with land owner as limited
partner and house builder as general partner is not security).
249. Alphabetically, those cases are Casali (Arkansas), Garrett (South Carolina), Kramer
(Missouri), Probst (Oklahoma), and Ribadeneira (Kansas).
250. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 159, at 289-90; Sunstein, supra note 159, at 416-24.
251. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. R~v. 1479,
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We do not see how it could be otherwise and still have the federal securities
laws serve a socially beneficial function.
Second, we believe the Supreme Court missed an important opportunity
to develop a holistic approach to the definition of "security," and thereby
the scope of the federal securities laws, when it restricted the Howey test to
investment contracts. The Court stated that to apply "the Howey test to
traditional stock and all other types of instruments listed in the statutory
definition would make the Acts' enumeration of many types of instruments
superfluous." '12 2 But this sort of grammarian logic is too simple. Consider
again the text of the definition of "security" in the Securities Act. 2 3 It does
in fact provide a list of instruments such as stock, notes and investment
contracts. But the list ends with the following phrase: "or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security'..

.

."2

As one

commentator has put it, the definition's litany of examples serve both a
"connotative" and a "denotative" purpose.2s5 Therefore, while the individual
instruments listed are separately included as securities, they also collectively
serve as examples of the general concept of a security. 6 Consider another
example. One approach to the definition of "animal" is to provide an
abstracted distillation of the essential qualities of an animal. Thus we might
say, "any of a kingdom (Anirnalia) of living beings typically differing from
plants in capacity for spontaneous movement and rapid motor response to
stimulation. ' "25 The other approach, used in the definition of "security," is
to defime by example. Therefore we might define "animal" as "including
any mammal, reptile, bird, fish, or, in general, other creature commonly
known as an animal." The list of examples is neither exhaustive nor itself
devoid of defmitional difficulty. But it conveys the abstracted concept since
each example manifests certain characteristics common to all. On the other
hand, each separate example also has characteristics unique to itself, such as
gills or wings or methods of reproduction.
The question for the Howey test was whether it served only to identify
characteristics unique to investment contracts or whether it sought to divine
the part by reference to the whole. The Court could have easily read its
investment contract precedents and their focus on economic realities as striving
for a connotative understanding, an abstract distillation of the entire litany
of examples rather than as an inquiry into the limited realm of investment
1479 (1987). See also Gumo CAi.unsi, A COmmON LAw FOR TnE AGE oF STATuTES (1982)
(advocating "common law function" for courts in interpreting statutes, to address in particular
statute's obsolescence); RoNALD DwomxN, LAw's EmpRE (1986) (advocating expansive role for
judiciary in statutory interpretation); Sunstein, supra note 159, at 439-41 (favoring judicial
capacity to render justice under open-ended interpretive authority); Note, supra note 159, at 91315 (advocating "common law model" for statutory interpretation by judges).
252. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985).
253. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1988).
254. Id.
255. Page, supra note 53, at 249.
256. See id. at 292-93 (discussing distinction between connotative and denotative analyses).
257. WNEBmR's NnfrH NEw CoaumATE DIc-nONARY 86 (1986).
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contracts. 25 Instead the Court read the Howey test as looking for gills or
wings. It is telling that in its very next opinion, the Court had to struggle
with its refusal to pursue a connotative definition of "security." While the
Court attempts to limit its new four-prong test established in Reves to
determining only the exceptions to the general presumption that notes are
securities, as we have seen in the state courts, that analysis has subsumed the
presumption. 2 9 Whether they like it or not, the Justices will always be forced
to apply some multi-factor test to the outer margins of "security." In
Landreth, they seemed to throw away several generations of work on developing one.
Finally, as has been the main contention of this Article, the authors
bemoan the literalist approach because of its influence on the state courts'
approach to their own securities laws. While generally the economic realities
test is alive and well in the state courts, 260 the literalist approach has made
some inroads under the aegis of federal-state harmony, notably in the cases
involving stock. 261 The authors contend that the state courts should pursue
the development of their economic realities approach even if that requires
open rejection of federal decisions.
As we have already stated, we believe the economic realities approach
provides the better avenue for developing a cogent, holistic approach to the
definition of "security" and the scope of the securities laws. State courts
have uniformly applied some form of this analysis to all cases, except those
involving stock after the Landreth decision.6 2 The vitality of this mode of
analysis in the state courts is evidenced by the continuing use of the Howey
and risk capital tests, 263 and the state courts' sublimation of the literalist
aspects of the Reves opinion.2
Viewed in the most favorable light, the literalist approach taken by the
Supreme Court is motivated by institutional concerns such as federalism,
separation of powers and electoral accountability, which do not constrain
state courts.mss As traditional common-law courts of general jurisdiction, state
courts share law-making authority with state legislatures. Therefore angst over
judicial activism, and consequent constraining devices such as a plain meaning
approach to statutory interpretation, are unnecessary in the state court context.

258. Previous commentators have argued for precisely this role for the Howey or Howeylike tests. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 44, at 315 (arguing that economic realities test is
overarching doctrine allowing courts to determine that securities laws will apply where they ought
to); Page, supra note 53, at 296-99 (constructing global definition for all securities based on
Howey test). See also Chang, supra note 1, at 413-32 (arguing that "security" should be viewed
as overarching concept to be applied by courts to determine whether transactions involving
instruments otherwise included in enumerated categories should be subject to securities laws).
259. See discussion supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
260. See supra Part III. B. and Part III. C.
261. See supra Part III. A.
262. See supra Part III. A.
263. See supra Part III. C.
264. See supra Part IIl. B.
265. See supra Part IV. A.
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It is therefore a mistake to sacrifice a deliberative development of a state's
securities law because of a slavish assimilation of these federal concerns under
an uncritical policy of uniformity.
Furthermore, the logic underlying the policy of harmony does not extend
to a requirement that federal and state securities laws be coextensive. 266 Other
than an argument against regulation in general, there is no reason why one
state should not feel free to expand the scope of its securities act to an
instrument not regulated by any other state or by the federal government. In
fact, unrestrained by an uncritical policy of harmonization, state courts will
offer the benefits of experimentation, offering a greater multiplicity of experiences from which to draw in both state and federal development of
securities regulation. Perhaps the single greatest example of the dynamic of
this experimentation is the risk capital test. The most important innovation
in the developing economic realities approach, the risk capital test was first
proposed by the California Supreme Court. 267 It was then adopted by the
Ninth Circuit.26
Of greatest concern, however, are the indications that the literal approach
taken by the federal courts to the securities laws stem from a lack of interest
and a search for facile solutions. If the federal courts are looking to literalism
for easy solutions, either because they are uninterested in the policy considerations behind the "sale of business" doctrine or the factual nuances behind
the label "general partnership," state courts may be forced to look to their
history and become again the primary forum for the protection of investors.

266. See supra Part IV. B.
267. See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961).
268. See, e.g., Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc. 583 F.2d 426 (9th
Cir. 1978) (applying risk capital test to notes); El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224
(9th Cir. 1974) (applying risk capital test to investment contracts), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900
(1974).

